A blog from the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics (CRB)

Category: In the research debate (Page 2 of 28)

Does the brain make room for free will?

The question of whether we have free will has been debated throughout the ages and everywhere in the world. Can we influence our future or is it predetermined? If everything is predetermined and we lack free will, why should we act responsibly and by what right do we hold each other accountable?

There have been different ideas about what predetermines the future and excludes free will. People have talked about fate and about the gods. Today, we rather imagine that it is about necessary causal relationships in the universe. It seems that the strict determinism of the material world must preclude the free will that we humans perceive ourselves to have. If we really had free will, we think, then nature would have to give us a space of our own to decide in. A causal gap where nature does not determine everything according to its laws, but allows us to act according to our will. But this seems to contradict our scientific world view.

In an article in the journal Intellectica, Kathinka Evers at CRB examines the plausibility of this choice between two extreme positions: either strict determinism that excludes free will, or free will that excludes determinism.

Kathinka Evers approaches the problem from a neuroscientific perspective. This particular perspective has historically tended to support one of the positions: strict determinism that excludes free will. How can the brain make room for free will, if our decisions are the result of electrochemical processes and of evolutionarily developed programs? Is it not right there, in the brain, that our free will is thwarted by material processes that give us no space to act?

Some authors who have written about free will from a neuroscientific perspective have at times explained away freedom as the brain’s user’s illusion: as a necessary illusion, as a fictional construct. Some have argued that since social groups function best when we as individuals assume ourselves to be responsible actors, we must, after all, keep this old illusion alive. Free will is a fiction that works and is needed in society!

This attitude is unsound, says Kathinka Evers. We cannot build our societies on assumptions that contradict our best knowledge. It would be absurd to hold people responsible for actions that they in fact have no ability to influence. At the same time, she agrees that the notion of free will is socially important. But if we are to retain the notion, it must be consistent with our knowledge of the brain.

One of the main points of the article is that our knowledge of the brain could actually provide some room for free will. The brain could function beyond the opposition between indeterminism and strict determinism, some neuroscientific theories suggest. This does not mean that there would be uncaused neural events. Rather, a determinism is proposed where the relationship between cause and effect is variable and contingent, not invariable and necessary, as we commonly assume. As far as I understand, it is about the fact that the brain has been shown to function much more independently, actively and flexibly than in the image of it as a kind of programmed machine. Different incoming nerve signals can stabilize different neural patterns of connections in the brain, which support the same behavioural ability. And the same incoming nerve signal can stabilize different patterns of connections in the brain that result in the same behavioural ability. Despite great variation in how individuals’ neural patterns of connections are stabilized, the same common abilities are supported. This model of the brain is thus deterministic, while being characterized by variability. It describes a kind of kaleidoscopically variable causality in the brain between incoming signals and resulting behaviours and abilities.

Kathinka Evers thus hypothetically suggests that this variability in the brain, if real, could provide empirical evidence that free will is compatible with determinism.

Read the philosophically exciting article here: Variable determinism in social applications: translating science to society

Although Kathinka Evers suggests that a certain amount of free will could be compatible with what we know about the brain, she emphasizes that neuroscience gives us increasingly detailed knowledge about how we are conditioned by inherited programs, for example, during adolescence, as well as by our conditions and experiences in childhood. We should, after all, be cautiously restrained in praising and blaming each other, she concludes the article, referring to the Stoic Epictetus, one of the philosophers who thought about free will and who rather emphasized freedom from the notion of a free will.

Pär Segerdahl

Written by…

Pär Segerdahl, Associate Professor at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics and editor of the Ethics Blog.

Evers Kathinka (2021/2). Variable Determinism in Social Applications: Translating Science to Society. In Monier Cyril & Khamassi Mehdi (Eds), Liberty and cognition, Intellectica, 75, pp.73-89.

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We like challenging questions

Artificial intelligence: augmenting intelligence in humans or creating human intelligence in machines?

Sometimes you read articles at the intersection of philosophy and science that contain really exciting visionary thoughts, which are at the same time difficult to really understand and assess. The technical elaboration of the thoughts grows as you read, and in the end you do not know if you are capable of thinking independently about the ideas or if they are about new scientific findings and trends that you lack the expertise to judge.

Today I dare to recommend the reading of such an article. The post must, of course, be short. But the fundamental ideas in the article are so interesting that I hope some readers of this post will also become readers of the article and make a serious attempt to understand it.

What is the article about? It is about an alternative approach to the highest aims and claims in artificial intelligence. Instead of trying to create machines that can do what humans can do, machines with higher-level capacities such as consciousness and morality, the article focuses on the possibility of creating machines that augment the intelligence of already conscious, morally thinking humans. However, this idea is not entirely new. It has existed for over half a century in, for example, cybernetics. So what is new in the article?

Something I myself was struck by was the compassionate voice in the article, which is otherwise not prominent in the AI ​​literature. The article focuses not on creating super-smart problem solvers, but on strengthening our connections with each other and with the world in which we live. The examples that are given in the article are about better moral considerations for people far away, better predictions of natural disasters in a complex climate, and about restoring social contacts in people suffering from depression or schizophrenia.

But perhaps the most original idea in the article is the suggestion that the development of these human self-augmenting machines would draw inspiration from how the brain already maintains contact with its environment. Here one should keep in mind that we are dealing with mathematical models of the brain and with innovative ways of thinking about how the brain interacts with the environment.

It is tempting to see the brain as an isolated organ. But the brain, via the senses and nerve-paths, is in constant dynamic exchange with the body and the world. You would not experience the world if the world did not constantly make new imprints in your brain and you constantly acted on those imprints. This intense interactivity on multiple levels and time scales aims to maintain a stable and comprehensible contact with a surrounding world. The way of thinking in the article reminds me of the concept of a “digital twin,” which I previously blogged about. But here it is the brain that appears to be a neural twin of the world. The brain resembles a continuously updated neural mirror image of the world, which it simultaneously continuously changes.

Here, however, I find it difficult to properly understand and assess the thoughts in the article, especially regarding the mathematical model that is supposed to describe the “adaptive dynamics” of the brain. But as I understand it, the article suggests the possibility of recreating a similar dynamic in intelligent machines, which could enhance our ability to see complex patterns in our environment and be in contact with each other. A little poetically, one could perhaps say that it is about strengthening our neural twinship with the world. A kind of neural-digital twinship with the environment? A digitally augmented neural twinship with the world?

I dare not say more here about the visionary article. Maybe I have already taken too many poetic liberties? I hope that I have at least managed to make you interested to read the article and to asses it for yourself: Augmenting Human Selves Through Artificial Agents – Lessons From the Brain.

Well, maybe one concluding remark. I mentioned the difficulty of sometimes understanding and assessing visionary ideas that are formulated at the intersection of philosophy and science. Is not that difficulty itself an example of how our contact with the world can sometimes weaken? However, I do not know if I would have been helped by digital intelligence augmentation that quickly took me through the philosophical difficulties that can arise during reading. Some questions seem to essentially require time, that you stop and think!

Giving yourself time to think is a natural way to deepen your contact with reality, known by philosophers for millennia.

Pär Segerdahl

Written by…

Pär Segerdahl, Associate Professor at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics and editor of the Ethics Blog.

Northoff G, Fraser M, Griffiths J, Pinotsis DA, Panangaden P, Moran R and Friston K (2022) Augmenting Human Selves Through Artificial Agents – Lessons From the Brain. Front. Comput. Neurosci. 16:892354. doi: 10.3389/fncom.2022.892354

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We recommend readings

Dignity in a nursing home when the body fails

The proportion of elderly people in the population is increasing and the tendency is to provide care for the elderly at home as long as possible. Nursing homes are therefore usually inhabited by the very weakest, with several concurrent illnesses and often in need of palliative care.

Living a dignified life in old age naturally becomes more difficult when the body and mind fail and you become increasingly dependent on others. As a nursing home resident, it can be close at hand to feel unworthy and a nuisance. And as staff, in stressful situations it can happen that you sometimes thoughtlessly treat the elderly in an undignified manner.

Preserving the dignity of the elderly is an important responsibility of nursing homes. But what does reality look like for the residents? How does the care provider take responsibility for dignified care? And is it reasonable to regard the residents as passive recipients of dignified care? Isn’t such a view in itself undignified?

These questions suggest that we need to look more closely at the reality of the elderly in a nursing home. Bodil Holmberg has done this together with Tove Godskesen, in a study published in the journal BMC Geriatrics. Participatory observations and interviews with residents and staff at a nursing home in Sweden provided rich material to analyse and reflect on.

As expected, it was found that the major threat to the residents’ dignity was precisely how the body fails at a faster rate. This created fear of becoming increasingly dependent on others as well as feelings of anguish, loneliness and meaninglessness. However, it was also found that the elderly themselves had a repertoire of ways to deal with their situation. Their self-knowledge enabled them to distinguish between what they could still do and what they had to accept. In addition, aging itself gave rise to new challenges to engage with. One of the residents proudly told how they had developed a way to pick up the grabbing tong when it had been dropped, by sliding deeper into the wheelchair to reach the floor. Teaching new staff how to carry out intricate medical procedures also gave rise to pride.

As aging challenges a dignified life, older people thus develop self-knowledge and a whole repertoire of ways to maintain a dignified life. This is an essential observation that the authors make. It shows the importance of not considering nursing home residents as passive recipients of dignified care. If I understand the authors correctly, they suggest that we could instead think in terms of assisting older people when their bodies fail: assisting them in their own attempts to lead dignified lives.

Participatory observations and interviews can help us see reality more clearly. The method can clarify both the expected and the unexpected. Read the pertinent article here: Dignity in bodily care at the end of life in a nursing home: an ethnographic study

The authors also found examples of undignified treatment of the residents. In another article, also from this year, they discuss barriers and facilitators of ethical encounters at the end of life in a nursing home. Reference to the latter article can be found below.

Pär Segerdahl

Written by…

Pär Segerdahl, Associate Professor at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics and editor of the Ethics Blog.

Holmberg, B., Godskesen, T. Dignity in bodily care at the end of life in a nursing home: an ethnographic study. BMC Geriatr 22, 593 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12877-022-03244-8

Holmberg, B., Godskesen, T. Barriers to and facilitators of ethical encounters at the end of life in a nursing home: an ethnographic study. BMC Palliat Care 21, 134 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12904-022-01024-0

This post in Swedish

Ethics needs empirical input

Where to publish and where not to publish in bioethics – the 2022 list

We have seen “predatory” publishing take off in a big way and noticed how colleagues start to turn up in the pages of some of these journals. While many have assumed that this phenomenon mainly is a problem for low-status universities, there are strong indications that predatory publishing is a part of a major trend towards the industrialization of misconduct and that it affects many top-flight research institutions (see Priyanka Pulla: “In India, elite institutes in shady journals”, Science 354(6319): 1511-1512).

This trend, referred to by some as the dark side of publishing, needs to be reversed. Thus we published this blog post in 2016. This is our fifth annual update (the first version can be found here). At first, we relied heavily on the work of Jeffrey Beall, a librarian at the University of Colorado, who run blacklists of “potential, possible, or probable” predatory publishers and journals. His lists have since been removed but are kept by others and they can also be found archived.

The latest effort to create a thorough list of predatory outlets comes from Cabells, who distinguish around 70 different unacceptable violations and employs a whole team reviewing journals. These lists are not, however, the final say on the matter, as it is impossible for one person or a limited group to judge reliably actors in every academic discipline.

A response of gatekeeping needs to be anchored in each discipline and the scholars who make up that discipline. As a suitable response in bioethics, we have chosen to, first, collect a few authoritative lists of recommended bioethics journals that can be consulted by anyone in bioethics to find good journals to publish with.

For our first post, we recommended a list of journals ourselves, which brought on some well-deserved questions and criticism about criteria for inclusion. Unfortunately then, our list ultimately drew attention from other parts of the message that we were more concerned to get across. Besides, there are many other parties making such lists. We, therefore, have dropped this feature. Instead, we have enlarged the collection of good journal lists to the service of our readers. They are all of great use when further exploring the reputable journals available:

It is of prime importance to list the journals that are potentially or possibly predatory or of such a low quality that it might be dishonoring to engage with them. We have listed all 50 of them alphabetically (one new entry for 2022, one has ceased operation and been removed), and provided both the homepage URL and links to any professional discussion of these journals that we have found (which most often alerted us to their existence in the first place).

Each of these journals asks scholars for manuscripts from, or claims to publish papers in bioethics or related areas (such as practical philosophy). They have been reviewed by the authors of this blog post as well as by a group of reference scholars that we have asked for advice on the list. Those journals listed have unanimously been agreed are journals that – in light of the criticism put forth and the quality we see – we would not deem acceptable for us to publish in. Typical signs as to why a journal could fall in this category, such as extensive spamming, publishing in almost any subject, or fake data being included on the website etc., are listed here:

We have started to more systematically evaluate the journals against the 25 defining characteristics we outlined in the article linked to above (with the help of science and technology PhD students). The results will be added when they exist.

We would love to hear about your views on this blog post, and be especially grateful for pointers to journals engaging in sloppy or bad publishing practices. The list is not meant as a check-list but as a starting point for any bioethics scholar to ponder for him- or herself where to publish.

Also, anyone thinking that a journal in our list should be given due reconsideration might post their reasons for this as a comment to the blog post or send an email to us. Journals might start out with some sloppy practices but shape up over time and we will be happy to hear about it. You can make an appeal against the inclusion of a journal and we will deal with it promptly and publicly.

Please spread the content of this blog as much as you can and check back for updates (we will do a major update annually and continually add any further information found).

Note to readers: The list contained on Stop Predatory Journals referred to below has been down for while. From 2022 any reference to journals/publishers being included on SPJ refers to their previous inclusion. We will gradually check for inclusion in the most prominent list presently available, Cabells’ Predatory Reports, as a alternative.

WHERE NOT TO PUBLISH IN BIOETHICS – THE 2022 LIST

  • Advanced Humanities & Social Sciences (Consortium Publisher)
    Critical remark (2018): It has been claimed that behind this journal you find OMICS, the most-ever discussed publisher of this kind, see http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/predatory-publisher-expanding-empire-in-canada. The only article published in 2016 is very badly edited, all the references are lost in the text and the paper would not pass an exam at our departments.  2017 volume is again only one article. The publisher is listed on SPJ.
    Critical remark (2022). After a complaint from the publisher, we have checked the latest volume. An article like this one shows no evident editorial work on the paper at all, so we still regard the journal to be a low quality outlet for research.
  • Advances In Medical Ethics  (Longdom Publishing)
    Critical remark (2019): When asked, one editor attest to the fact that his editorship was forged. Publisher was on Beall’s list and is now listed at Cabells with 5 violations. A thorough review December 2019 concludes that it exhibits at least 7 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
    Update: A more recent review (2022) concludes that it exhibits about 17 such criteria. How an e-mail exchange with this publisher can turn out is shown here.
  • American Open Ethics Journal (Research and Knowledge Publication)
    Critical remark (2019): Listed on Cabells with 7 violations.
    Update: A thorough review February 2020 concludes that it exhibits at least 11 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • Annals of Bioethics & Clinical Applications (Medwin Publishers)
    Criticism 1 
    Critical remark (2019): Publisher was on Beall’s list and is on many other lists of these journals. They say that they are “accepting all type of original works that is related to the disciplines of the journal” and indeed the flow chart of manuscript handling does not have a reject route. Indexed by alternative indexes.
    Critical remark (2020): Listed on Cabells with 5 violations. A thorough review October 2020 concludes that it exhibits at least 9 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • Austin Journal of Genetics and Genomic Research (Austin Publishing Group)
    Criticism 1 │Criticism 2 │Criticism 3
    Critical remark (2017): Spam e-mail about special issue on bioethics; Listed by SPJ; Romanian editorial member is said to be from a university in “Europe”; Another editorial board member is just called “Michael”; APG has been sued by International Association for Dental Research and The American Association of Neurological Surgeons for infringing on their IP rights. Student reviews concludes the journal is not suitable to publish in, one finding that the journal exhibits at least 16 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
    Critical remark (2019): Listed by Cabells with 10 violations.
    Critical remark (2021): A thorough review concludes that the journals exhibits at least 13 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • British Open Journal of Ethics (British Open Research Publications)
    Critical remark (2019): Listed by Cabells with 6 violations.
    Critical remark (2022): A thorough review concludes that the journal exhibit many criteria for “predatory” journals, for example that no editorial board exists and the journal is not indexed, and that it is strongly recommended to avoid “publishing” with this journal.
  • Creative Education (Scientific Research Publishing – SCIRP)
    Criticism 1 │ Criticism 2
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; They claim misleadingly to be indexed by ISI but this relates to be among cited articles only – they are not indexed. A thorough review May 2017 concludes that it exhibits at least 5 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
    Update (2022): Listed on Cabells with 3 violations.
  • Eastern European Scientific Journal (East European Research Alliance)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Criticised by Beall for having a bogus editorial board; Claims to be indexed by ISI but that is not the well-known Institute for Scientific Information (now Thompson Reuters), but rather the so-called International Scientific Indexing.
    Update: Thorough reviews November 2018 and February 2019  conclude that it exhibits at least 13 or 14 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
    Update (2022): Listed on Cabells under its old name (“East”) with 11 violations.
  • Ethics Today Journal (Franklin Publishing)
    Critical remark (2019): Listed by Cabells with 9 violations.
    Update: “www.franklinpublishing.net expired on 06/21/2022 and is pending renewal or deletion”
  • European Academic Research (Kogaion Publishing Center, formerly Bridge Center)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Uses impact factor from Universal Impact Factor (now defunct); A thorough review May 2017 concludes that it exhibits at least 15 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
    Update: A thorough review October 2022 concludes that it exhibits at least 14 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • European Scientific Journal (European Scientific Institute)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Use of alternative indexes. A thorough review May 2017 concludes that it exhibits at least 9 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
    Update: A thorough review November 2022 concludes that it exhibits at least 6 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Advances in Social Science and Humanities
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Impact factor given by  Global Impact Factor. A thorough review March 2019 concludes that it exhibits at least 10 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Contemporary Research & Review
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Indexed by Index Copernicus; Despite claims they seem not to be indexed by either Chemical Abstracts or DOAJ. 
    A thorough review June 2017 concludes that it exhibits at least 9 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Current Research
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Uses IF from SJIF and Index Copernicus and more. It wrongly claims to be indexed by Thomson Reuters, ORCID and having a DOI among other things. A thorough review January 2018 concludes that it exhibits at least 12 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Current Research and Academic Review (Excellent Publishers)
    Critical remark (June 2018): Listed by SPJ and Cabells because of misleading claims about credentials, metrics, and too quick review; alternative indexing; publishes in almost any field imaginable; the editor -in-chief is head of the “Excellent Education and Researh Institute” (sic) which does not seem to exist even when spelled right?
    Update: A thorough review in December 2019 concludes that it exhibits at least 12 of the 25 criteria for “predatory journals”.
    Update (2022): A thorough review in July concludes that it exhibits at least 13 of the 25 criteria for “predatory journals”.
  • International Journal of Ethics (Nova Science Publishers)
    Criticism 1
    Critical remark (2022): The article on Nova at Wikipedia notes that librarians have been critical of this publisher; A Ms. Alexandra Columbus is both the owner of, business manager and customer contact for Nova.
  • International Journal of Ethics & Moral Philosophy (Journal Network)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Publisher was criticized by Beall when launching 350 journals at once; After several years not one associate editor has signed up and no article has been published; No editorial or contact details available. Thorough reviews in May 2019 and February 2020 conclude that it exhibits at least 10 to 12 of the 25 criteria for “predatory journals”.
    Update (2022): Does not seem to be online.
  • International Journal of Ethics in Engineering & Management Education
    Critical remark (2019): Papers from almost any field; Claims to have a 5.4 Impact factor (from IJEEE); Indexed by GJIF etc. A non-existent address in “Varginia”, US (sic!); Open access but asks for the copyright; Claims to be indexed in Scopus can’t be verified.
    Update (2020): Thorough reviews February 2018 and February 2020 conclude that it exhibits at least 16-17 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals. Listed by Cabells with 11 violations found.
  • International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (Centre for Promoting Ideas)
    Criticism 1Criticism 2Criticism 3 │ Criticism 4
    Critical remark (2019): The chief editor listed in April 2014  is a deceased person (2018). A thorough review in April 2019 concludes that it exhibits at least 9 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention
    Criticism 1 
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ and is on many other lists of blacklisted journals; An IF of 4.5 given by African Quality Centre for Journals; Open access but asks for the copyright; Publishes any subject; Says that the journal is indexed in DOAJ which it does not seem to be. 
    Update: A thorough review February 2018 concludes that it exhibits at least 13 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Research
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ and Cabells; Claims an IF of 5.22 (by “Research Journal Impact Factor“); Despite title from India; Alternative indexing; Thorough reviews in February 2018 and February 2020 conclude that it exhibits at least 10-13 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Has an amazing fast-track review option for $100 that guarantees “the review, editorial decision, author notification and publication” to take place “within 2 weeks”. “Editors” claim that repeated requests to be removed from the list of editors result in nothing. Thorough reviews in  February and June 2018 conclude that it seems to exhibit at least 7 to 10 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Humanities & Social Studies
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; IF from International Impact Factor Services; States that there “is no scope of correction after the paper publication”.
    Critical remark (2018): They write that the “review process will be completed expectedly within 3-4 days”.
    Critical remark (2020): A thorough review in October 2020 concludes that it seems to exhibit at least 7-8 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues (Jacobs Publishers)
    Criticism 1
    Critical remark (2019): Spamming with invitation to publish. They are unsure of their own name; in the e-mail they call the journal “International Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Affairs“! Publisher listed on SPJ. Editor-in-chief and editorial board are missing. Claims that material is “written by leading scholars” which is obviously false.
    Update (2022): Publisher cannot be found any longer.
  • International Journal of Philosophy (SciencePG)
    Criticism 1 │ Criticism 2
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Alternative indexing and also IF from Universal Impact Factor (now defunct); Promises a two-week peer review.
    Update: Thorough reviews in April and November 2018 conclude that it seems to exhibit at least 10 or 8 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals and also find obvious examples of pseudo-science among the published articles.
  • International Journal of Philosophy and Theology (American Research Institute for Policy Development) Criticism 1Criticism 2 │ Criticism 3
    Critical remark: A thorough review in June 2018 concludes that “there are grounds to believe that the American Research Institute never intended to create a serious scientific periodical and that, on the contrary, its publications are out-and-out predatory journals.”
    Update (2022): A thorough review in June concludes that it seems to exhibit at least 9 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals. However, the website could not be accessed on June 21.
  • International Journal of Public Health and Human Rights (Bioinfo Publications)
    Criticism 1
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ; On many other lists of predatory journals and have an IF from Index Copernicus.
    Update (2022): Not accessible in June.
  • International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies (Sryahwa Publications)
    Critical remark (2018): Listed on SPJ; Open access but asks for the copyright. A thorough review in April 2018 concludes that it seems to exhibit at least 9 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
    Update (2022): A June review again confirmed that it seems to exhibit at least 9 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research (Research Publish Journals)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ; On their homepage they state that in order to get a high IF their journals are “indexed in top class organisation around the world” although no major index is used.
    Update: A thorough review in 2020 concludes that it seems to exhibit at least 14 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Open Journal of Philosophy (Academic and Scientific Publishing)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ and was heavily critized on Beall’s blog; The editorial board consists of one person from Iran; Although boosting 12 issues a year they have published only 1 article in the journal’s first four years.
    Update: A thorough review March 1 2017 concludes that it exhibits 17 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals and one in March 2019 that it exhibits at least 13 criteria.
  • International Researchers
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ; Indexed by e.g. Index Copernicus; Claims that it is “Monitor by Thomson Reuters” but is not part of the TR journal citation reports; Several pages are not working at time of review; A thorough review April 24 2017 concludes that it exhibits at least 6 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • Internet Journal of Law, Healthcare and Ethics (ISPUB)
    Criticism 1 │ Criticism 2
    Critical remark (2017): Formerly on Beall’s list.
  • Journal of Academic and Business Ethics (Academic and Business Research Institute)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ as well as several other; Journal seems uncertain about it’s own name, the header curiously says “Journal of ethical and legal issues”.
    Update 2021: A thorough review May 2021 concludes that it exhibits at least 7 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • Journal of Bioethics and Applications (Sci Forschen)
    Critical remark (2018): Brand new journal with no articles yet. Publisher has been criticized for spamming , have a bad record at Scam Analyze, and is listed on SPJ.
    Critical remark (2022): A thorough review March 2022 concludes that it exhibits at least 7 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • Journal of Clinical Research & Bioethics (OMICS/Walsh MedicalMedia)
    Criticism 1Criticism 2 │ Criticism 3 │ Criticism 4 │ Criticism 5 │ Criticism 6
    Critical remark (2017): This publisher is listed on SPJ and was taken to court for possible fraud by the Federal Trade Commission in the US (and lost). They are listed by Cabells for 8 violations.
    Update (2022): They now have a new (?) publisher, but still the same Danish editor as before. A thorough review May 2022 concludes that it exhibits at least 7 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • Journal of Law and Ethics
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ; Claims to be on Ulrichs but is not; Claims to be in the Norwegian list and can actually be found there but under its former name (4 years earlier) and with 0 points.
    Update 2019: Seems to have moved to here. Security warnings and denied access makes it impossible to check whether it is the same journal or another one.
  • Journal of Philosophy and Ethics (Sryahwa Publications)
    Critical remark (2019): listed by Cabells for 7 violations.
    Critical remark 2020): A thorough review October 2020 concludes that it exhibits at least 11 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • Journal of Research in Philosophy and History (Scholink)
    Criticism 1 
    Critical remark (June 2018): Listed on several lists of predatory publishers. They only do “peer review” through their own editorial board, a flowchart states. They claim to check for plagiarism but the first 2018 article abstract run by us through a checker turned out to be self-plagiarized from a book and it looks to have been published many times over. Unfortunately, the next paper checked in the same issue was also published the previous year by another journal listed here…
    Critical remark (March 2021): A thorough review concludes that it exhibits at least 14 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (AASCIT)
    Criticism 1Criticism 2Criticism 3
    Critical remark (2019): From law to religion, this journal publishes it all. Though publisher claims to be “American”, it has only two editors, both from India. The list from Cabells includes 13 journals from this publisher. The AASCIT Code of Ethics apparently plagiarizes the INCOSE Code of Ethics.
  • Journal of Studies in Social Sciences and Humanities
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ; Alternative indexing; Uses several alternative IF providers. A thorough review October 2017 concludes that it exhibits at least 9 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
    Critical remark (2020): A thorough review October 2020 concludes that it exhibits at least 4 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • JSM Health Education and Primary Health Care
    Spamming with invitation to special issue on ‘Bioethics’. The publisher is listed on SPJ,  and criticized and exposed here. It is indexed by spoof indexer Directory of Research Journals Indexing among others (whose website is now gone, BTW).
    Update (2019): Access denied because of non-secure connection.
    Update (2022): Access now possible again.
  • Medical Ethics and Communication (Avid Science)
    Criticism 1
    Critical remarks (2017): Listed on SPJ; Spamming researchers with offer of eBook publication for $350.
    Update: In June 2022, the journal cannot be accessed online.
  • Nova Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences
    Criticism 1
    Critical remark (2018): This publisher was on Beall’s list; Uses alternative impact factors and indexing; Publishes in less than 30 days; Curiously, it says no fee is charged for publication.
    Update: In June 2022, the journal cannot be accessed online.
  • Open Journal of Philosophy (Scientific Research Publishing – SCIRP)
    Criticism 1 │ Criticism 2 │
    Critical remark (2021): A thorough review March 2021 concludes that it exhibits 6 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • Open Journal for Studies in Philosophy (Center for Open Access in Science)
    Critical remark (2020): Cabells found 8 violations.
    Update: Thorough reviews May-June 2022 concludes that it exhibits at least 8-9 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • Philosophical Papers and Review (Academic Journals)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ and blacklisted by the Ministry of Higher Education of Malaysia.
    Update (2021): Latest article in press was accepted the same day it was sent in – and it happened back in 2018!
    Update: A thorough review April 2022 concludes that it exhibits at least 10 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • Philosophy Study  (David Publishing Company)
    Criticism 1Criticism 2
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ. A thorough review October 2019 concludes that it exhibits approx. 8 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • The Recent Advances in Academic Science Journal (Swedish Scientific Publications)
    Critical remark (2018): Despite the publisher’s name it seems based in India. The only Swedish editor’s existence cannot be verified. Website quality is lacking. Listed on SPJ. A thorough review October 2017 concludes that it exhibits at least 15 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
    Update: Domain for sale in June 2022.
  • Universal Open Ethics Journal (Adyan Academic Press)
    Critical remark (2019): listed by Cabells for 7 violations.
    Update: Thorough reviews in May 2022 concludes that it exhibits 13 to 20 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • World Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (Science and Education Publishing, SciEP)
    Criticism 1 │Criticism 2
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ as well as many other.
    Update: A thorough review in May 2019 concludes that it exhibits at least 7 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.

End remark:

In light of legal action and threats against people trying to warn others about dubious publishers and journals – see here and here, for example – we want to stress that this blog post is about where we would like our articles to show up, it is about quality, and as such it is an expression of a professional judgement intended to help authors find good journals with which to publish.

Indirectly, this may also help readers to be more discerning about the articles they read. As such it is no different from other rankings that can be found for various products and services everywhere. Our list of where not to publish implies no accusation of deception or fraud but claims to identify journals that experienced bioethicists would usually not find to be of high quality. Those criticisms linked to might be more upfront or confrontational; us linking to them does not imply an endorsement of any objectionable statement made therein. We would also like to point out that individual papers published in these journals might of course nevertheless be perfectly acceptable contributions to the scholarly literature of bioethics.

Essential resources on so-called predatory publishing and open access:

Written by…

Stefan Eriksson, Associate Professor of Research Ethics at Uppsala University, read more about his work on publication, regulation and consent.

and…

Gert Helgesson, professor of Medical Ethics at Karolinska Institute.


We like ethics

An ethical strategy for improving the healthcare of brain-damaged patients

How can we improve the clinical care of brain-damaged patients? Individual clinicians, professional and patient associations, and other relevant stakeholders are struggling with this huge challenge.

A crucial step towards a better treatment of these very fragile patients is the elaboration and adoption of agreed-upon recommendations for their clinical treatment, both in emergency and intensive care settings. These recommendations should cover different aspects, from diagnosis to prognosis and rehabilitation plan. Both Europe and the US have issued relevant guidelines on Disorders of Consciousness (DoCs) in order to make clinical practice consistent and ultimately more beneficial to patients.

Nevertheless, these documents risk becoming ineffective or not having sufficient impact if they are not complemented with a clear strategy for operationalizing them. In other words, it is necessary to develop an adequate translation of the guidelines into actual clinical practice.

In a recent article that I wrote with Arleen Salles, we argue that ethics plays a crucial role in elaborating and implementing this strategy. The application of the guidelines is ethically very relevant, as it can directly impact the patients’ well-being, their right to the best possible care, communication between clinicians and family members, and overall shared decision-making. Failure to apply the guidelines in an ethically sound manner may inadvertently lead to unequal and unfair treatment of certain patients.

To illustrate, both documents recommend integrating behavioural and instrumental approaches to improve the diagnostic accuracy of DoCs (such as vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, minimally conscious state, and cognitive-motor dissociation). This recommendation is commendable, but not easy to follow because of a number of shortcomings and limitations in the actual clinical settings where patients with DoCs are diagnosed and treated. For instance, not all “ordinary,” non-research oriented hospitals have the necessary financial, human, and technical resources to afford the dual approach recommended by the guidelines. The implementation of the guidelines is arguably a complex process, involving several actors at different levels of action (from the administration to the clinical staff, from the finances to the therapy, etc.). Therefore, it is crucial to clearly identify “who is responsible for what” at each level of the implementation process.

For this reason, we propose that a strategy is built up to operationalize the guidelines, based on a clarification of the notion of responsibility. We introduce a Distributed Responsibility Model (DRM), which frames responsibility as multi-level and multi-dimensional. The main tenet of DRM is a shift from an individualistic to a modular understanding of responsibility, where several agents share professional and/or moral obligations across time. Moreover, specific responsibilities are assigned depending on the different areas of activity. In this way, each agent is assigned a specific autonomy in relation to their field of activity, and the mutual interaction between different agents is clearly defined. As a result, DRM promotes trust between the various agents.

Neither the European nor the US guidelines explicitly address the issue of implementation in terms of responsibility. We argue that this is a problem, because in situations of scarce resources and financial and technological constraints, it is important to explicitly conceptualize responsibility as a distributed ethical imperative that involves several actors. This will make it easier to identify possible failures at different levels and to implement adequate corrective action.

In short, we identify three main levels of responsibility: institutional, clinical, and interpersonal. At the institutional level, responsibility refers to the obligations of the relevant institution or organization (such as the hospital or the research centre). At the clinical level, responsibility refers to the obligations of the clinical staff. At the interpersonal level, responsibility refers to the involvement of different stakeholders with individual patients (more specifically, institutions, clinicians, and families/surrogates).

Our proposal in the article is thus to combine these three levels, as formalized in DRM, in order to operationalize the guidelines. This can help reduce the gap between the recommendations and actual clinical practice.

Written by…

Michele Farisco, Postdoc Researcher at Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics, working in the EU Flagship Human Brain Project.

Farisco, Michele; Salles, Arleen. American and European Guidelines on Disorders of Consciousness: Ethical Challenges of Implementation, Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation: April 13, 2022. doi: 10.1097/HTR.0000000000000776

We want solid foundations

Safeguards when biobank research complies with the General Data Protection Regulation

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) entails a tightening of EU data protection rules. These rules do not only apply to the processing of personal data by companies. They apply in general, also to scientific research, which in many cases could entail serious restrictions on research. However, the GDPR allows for several derogations and exemptions when it comes to research that would otherwise probably be made impossible or considerably more difficult.

Such derogations are allowed only if appropriate safeguards, which are in accordance with the regulation, are in place. But what safeguards may be required? Article 89 of the regulation mentions technical and organizational measures to ensure compliance with the principle of data minimization: personal data shall be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed. Otherwise, Article 89 does not specify what safeguards are required, or what it means that the safeguards must be in accordance with the GDPR.

Biobank and genetic research require large amounts of biological samples and health-related data. Personal data may need to be stored for a long time and reused by new research groups for new research purposes. This would not be possible if the regulation did not grant an exemption from the rule that personal data may not be stored longer than necessary and for purposes not specified at data collection. But the question remains, what safeguards may be required to grant exemption?

The issue is raised by Ciara Staunton and three co-authors in an article in Frontiers in Genetics. The article begins by discussing the regulation and how to interpret the requirement that the safeguards should be “in accordance with the GDPR.” Then six possible safeguards are proposed for biobank and genetic research. The proposal is based on a thorough review of a number of documents that regulate health research.

Here, I merely want to recommend reading to anyone working on the issue of appropriate safeguards in biobank and genetic research. Therefore, I mention only briefly that the proposed safeguards concern (1) consent, (2) independent review and oversight, (3) accountable processes, (4) clear and transparent policies and processes, (5) security, and (6) training and education.

If you want to know more about the proposed safeguards, you will find the article here: Appropriate Safeguards and Article 89 of the GDPR: Considerations for Biobank, Databank and Genetic Research.

Pär Segerdahl

Written by…

Pär Segerdahl, Associate Professor at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics and editor of the Ethics Blog.

Ciara Staunton, Santa Slokenberga, Andrea Parziale and Deborah Mascalzoni. Appropriate Safeguards and Article 89 of the GDPR: Considerations for Biobank, Databank and Genetic Research. Frontiers in Genetics. 18 February 2022 doi: 10.3389/fgene.2022.719317

This post in Swedish

We recommend readings

Using surplus embryos to treat Parkinson’s disease: perceptions among the Swedish public

The use of human embryos in stem cell research can create moral unease, as embryos are usually destroyed when researchers extract stem cells from them. If one considers the embryo as a potential life, this can be perceived as a human life opportunity being extinguished.

At the same time, stem cell research aims to support human life through the development of treatments for diseases that today lack effective treatment. Moreover, not everyone sees the embryo as a potential life. When stem cell research is regulated, policymakers can therefore benefit from current knowledge about the public’s attitudes to this research.

Åsa Grauman and Jennifer Drevin recently published an interview study of perceptions among the Swedish public about the use of donated embryos for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease. The focus in the interviews on a specific disease is interesting, as it emphasizes the human horizon of stem cell research. This can nuance the issues and invite more diverse reasoning.

The interviewees were generally positive about using donated surplus embryos from IVF treatment to develop stem cell treatment for Parkinson’s disease. This also applied to participants who saw the embryo as a potential life. However, this positive attitude presupposed a number of conditions. The participants emphasized, among other things, that informed consent must be obtained from both partners in the couple, and that the researchers must show respect and sensitivity in their work with embryos. The latter requirement was also made by participants who did not see the embryo as a potential life. They emphasized that people have different values and that researchers and the pharmaceutical industry should take note of this.

Many participants also considered that the use of embryos in research on Parkinson’s disease is justified because the surplus embryos would otherwise be discarded without benefit. Several also expressed a priority order, where surplus embryos should primarily be donated to other couples, secondarily to drug development, and lastly discarded.

If you want to see more results, read the study: Perceptions on using surplus embryos for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease among the Swedish population: a qualitative study.

I would like to mention that the complexity of the questions was also expressed in such a way that one and the same person could express different perceptions in different parts of the interview, and switch back and forth between different perspectives. This is not a defect, I would say, but a form of wisdom that is essential when difficult ethical issues are discussed.

Pär Segerdahl

Written by…

Pär Segerdahl, Associate Professor at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics and editor of the Ethics Blog.

Grauman, Å., Drevin, J. Perceptions on using surplus embryos for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease among the Swedish population: a qualitative study. BMC Med Ethics 23, 15 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-022-00759-y

This post in Swedish

Ethics needs empirical input

How can we detect consciousness in brain-damaged patients?

Detecting consciousness in brain-damaged patients can be a huge challenge and the results are often uncertain or misinterpreted. In a previous post on this blog I described six indicators of consciousness that I introduced together with a neuroscientist and another philosopher. Those indicators were originally elaborated targeting animals and AI systems. Our question was: what capacities (deducible from behavior and performance or relevant cerebral underpinnings) make it reasonable to attribute consciousness to these non-human agents? In the same post, I mentioned that we were engaged in a multidisciplinary exploration of the clinical relevance of selected indicators, specifically for testing them on patients with Disorders of Consciousness (DoCs, for instance, Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome, Minimally Conscious State, Cognitive-Motor Dissociation). While this multidisciplinary work is still in progress, we recently published an ethical reflection on the clinical relevance of the indicators of consciousness, taking DoCs as a case study.

To recapitulate, indicators of consciousness are conceived as particular capacities that can be deduced from the behavior or cognitive performance of a subject and that serve as a basis for a reasonable inference about the level of consciousness of the subject in question. Importantly, also the neural correlates of the relevant behavior or cognitive performance may make possible deducing the indicators of consciousness.  This implies the relevance of the indicators to patients with DoCs, who are often unable to behave or to communicate overtly. Responses in the brain can be used to deduce the indicators of consciousness in these patients.

On the basis of this relevance, we illustrate how the different indicators of consciousness might be applied to patients with DoCs with the final goal of contributing to improve the assessment of their residual conscious activity. In fact, a still astonishing rate of misdiagnosis affects this clinical population. It is estimated that up to 40 % of patients with DoCs are wrongly diagnosed as being in Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome, while they are actually in a Minimally Conscious State. The difference of these diagnoses is not minimal, since they have importantly different prognostic implications, which raises a huge ethical problem.

We also argue for the need to recognize and explore the specific quality of the consciousness possibly retained by patients with DoCs. Because of the devastating damages of their brain, it is likely that their residual consciousness is very different from that of healthy subjects, usually assumed as a reference standard in diagnostic classification. To illustrate, while consciousness in healthy subjects is characterized by several distinct sensory modalities (for example, seeing, hearing and smelling), it is possible that in patients with DoCs, conscious contents (if any) are very limited in sensory modalities. These limitations may be evaluated based on the extent of the brain damage and on the patients’ residual behaviors (for instance, sniffing for smelling). Also, consciousness in healthy subjects is characterized by both dynamics and stability: it includes both dynamic changes and short-term stabilization of contents. Again, in the case of patients with DoCs, it is likely that their residual consciousness is very unstable and flickering, without any capacity for stabilization. If we approach patients with DoCs without acknowledging that consciousness is like a spectrum that accommodates different possible shapes and grades, we exclude a priori the possibility of recognizing the peculiarity of consciousness possibly retained by these patients.

The indicators of consciousness we introduced offer a potential help to identify the specific conscious abilities of these patients. While in this paper we argue for the rationale behind the clinical use of these indicators, and for their relevance to patients with DoCs, we also acknowledge that they open up new lines of research with concrete application to patients with DoCs. As already mentioned, this more applied work is in progress and we are confident of being able to present relevant results in the weeks to come.

Written by…

Michele Farisco, Postdoc Researcher at Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics, working in the EU Flagship Human Brain Project.

Farisco, M., Pennartz, C., Annen, J. et al. Indicators and criteria of consciousness: ethical implications for the care of behaviourally unresponsive patients. BMC Med Ethics 2330 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-022-00770-3

We have a clinical perspective

Can consumers help counteract antimicrobial resistance?

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) occurs when microorganisms (bacteria and viruses, etc.) survive treatments with antimicrobial drugs, such as antibiotics. However, the problem is not only caused by unwise use of such drugs on humans. Such drugs are also used on a large scale in animals in food production, which is a significant cause of AMR.

In an article in the journal Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, Mirko Ancillotti and three co-authors discuss the possibility that food consumers can contribute to counteracting AMR. This is a specific possibility that they argue is often overlooked when addressing the general public.

A difficulty that arises when AMR needs to be handled by several actors, such as authorities, food producers, consumers and retailers, is that the actors transfer the responsibility to the others. Consumers can claim that they would buy antibiotic-smart goods if they were offered in stores, while retailers can claim that they would sell such goods if consumers demanded them. Both parties can also blame how, for example, the market or legislation governs them. Another problem is that if one actor, for example the authorities, takes great responsibility, other actors feel less or no responsibility.

The authors of the article propose that one way out of the difficulty could be to influence consumers to take individual responsibility for AMR. Mirko Ancillotti has previously found evidence that people care about antibiotic resistance. Perhaps a combination of social pressure and empowerment could engage consumers to individually act more wisely from an AMR perspective?

The authors make comparisons with the climate movement and suggest digital innovations in stores and online, which can inform, exert pressure and support AMR-smarter food choices. One example could be apps that help consumers see their purchasing pattern, suggest product alternatives, and inform about what is gained from an AMR perspective by choosing the alternative.

Read the article with its constructive proposal to engage consumers against antimicrobial resistance: The Status Quo Problem and the Role of Consumers Against Antimicrobial Resistance.

Pär Segerdahl

Written by…

Pär Segerdahl, Associate Professor at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics and editor of the Ethics Blog.

Ancillotti, Mirko; Nilsson, Elin; Nordvall, Anna-Carin; Oljans, Emma. The Status Quo Problem and the Role of Consumers Against Antimicrobial Resistance. Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, 2022.

This post in Swedish

Approaching future issues

How can neuroethics and AI ethics join their forces?

As I already wrote on this blog, there has been an explosion of AI in recent years. AI affects so many aspects of our lives that it is virtually impossible to avoid interacting with it. Since AI has such an impact, it must be examined from an ethical point of view, for the very basic reason that it can be developed and/or used for both good and evil.

In fact, AI ethics is becoming increasingly popular nowadays. As it is a fairly young discipline, even though it has roots in, for example, digital and computer ethics, the question is open about its status and methodology. To simplify the debate, the main trend is to conceive AI ethics in terms of practical ethics, for example, with a focus on the impact of AI on traditional practices in education, work, healthcare, entertainment, among others. In addition to this practically oriented analysis, there is also attention to the impact of AI on the way we understand our society and ourselves as part of it.

In this debate about the identity of AI ethics, the need for a closer collaboration with neuroethics has been briefly pointed out, but so far no systematic reflection has been made on this need. In a new article, I propose, together with Kathinka Evers and Arleen Salles, an argument to justify the need for closer collaboration between neuroethics and AI ethics. In a nutshell, even though they both have specific identities and their topics do not completely overlap, we argue that neuroethics can complement AI ethics for both content-related and methodological reasons.

Some of the issues raised by AI are related to fundamental questions that neuroethics has explored since its inception. Think, for example, of topics such as intelligence: what does it mean to be intelligent? In what sense can a machine be qualified as an intelligent agent? Could this be a misleading use of words? And what ethical implications can this linguistic habit have, for example, on how we attribute responsibility to machines and to humans? Another issue that is increasingly gaining ground in AI ethics literature, as I wrote on this blog, is the conceivability and the possibility of artificial consciousness. Neuroethics has worked extensively on both intelligence and consciousness, combining applied and fundamental analyses, which can serve as a source of relevant information for AI ethics.

In addition to the above content-related reasons, neuroethics can also provide AI ethics with a methodological model. To illustrate, the kind of conceptual clarification performed in fundamental neuroethics can enrich the identification and assessment of the practical ethical issues raised by AI. More specifically, neuroethics can provide a three-step model of analysis to AI ethics: 1. Conceptual relevance: can specific notions, such as autonomy, be attributed to AI? 2. Ethical relevance: are these specific notions ethically salient (i.e., do they require ethical evaluation)? 3. Ethical value: what is the ethical significance and the related normative implications of these specific notions?

This three-step approach is a promising methodology for ethical reflection about AI which avoids the trap anthropocentric self-projection, a risk that actually affects both the philosophical reflection on AI and its technical development.

In this way, neuroethics can contribute to avoiding both hypes and disproportionate worries about AI, which are among the biggest challenges facing AI ethics today.

Written by…

Michele Farisco, Postdoc Researcher at Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics, working in the EU Flagship Human Brain Project.

Farisco, M., Evers, K. & Salles, A. On the Contribution of Neuroethics to the Ethics and Regulation of Artificial Intelligence. Neuroethics 15, 4 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-022-09484-0

We transcend disciplinary borders

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