A blog from the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics (CRB)

Month: February 2023

A new project will explore the prospect of artificial awareness

The neuroethics group at CRB has just started its work as part of a new European research project about artificial awareness. The project is called “Counterfactual Assessment and Valuation for Awareness Architecture” (CAVAA), and is funded for a duration of four years. The consortium is composed of 10 institutions, coordinated by the Radboud University in the Netherlands.

The goal of CAVAA is “to realize a theory of awareness instantiated as an integrated computational architecture…, to explain awareness in biological systems and engineer it in technological ones.” Different specific objectives derive from this general goal. First, CAVAA has a robust theoretical component: it relies on a strong theoretical framework. Conceptual reflection on awareness, including its definition and the identification of features that allow its attribution to either biological organisms or artificial systems, is an explicit task of the project. Second, CAVAA is interested in exploring the connection between awareness in biological organisms and its possible replication in artificial systems. The project thus gives much attention to the connection between neuroscience and AI. Third, against this background, CAVAA aims at replicating awareness in artificial settings. Importantly, the project also has a clear ethical responsibility, more specifically about anticipating the potential societal and ethical impact of aware artificial systems.

There are several reasons why a scientific project with a strong engineering and computer science component also has philosophers on board. We are asked to contribute to developing a strong and consistent theoretical account of awareness, including the conceptual conceivability and the technical feasibility of its artificial replication. This is not straightforward, not only because there are many content-related challenges, but also because there are logical traps to avoid. For instance, we should avoid the temptation to validate an empirical statement on the basis of our own theory: this would possibly be tautological or circular.

In addition to this theoretical contribution, we will also collaborate in identifying indicators of awareness and benchmarks for validating the cognitive architecture that will be developed. Finally, we will collaborate in the ethical analysis concerning potential future scenarios related to artificial awareness, such as the possibility of developing artificial moral agents or the need to extend moral rights also to artificial systems.

In the end, there are several potential contributions that philosophy can provide to the scientific attempt to replicate biological awareness in artificial systems. Part of this possible collaboration is the fundamental and provoking question: why should we try to develop artificial awareness at all? What is the expected benefit, should we succeed? This is definitely an open question, with possible arguments for and against attempting such a grand accomplishment.

There is also another question of equal importance, which may justify the effort to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for artificial systems to become aware, and how to recognize them as such. What if we will inadvertently create (or worse: have already created) forms of artificial awareness, but do not recognize this and treat them as if they were unaware? Such scenarios also confront us with serious ethical issues. So, regardless of our background beliefs about artificial awareness, it is worth investing in thinking about it.

Stay tuned to hear more from CAVAA!

Written by…

Michele Farisco, Postdoc Researcher at Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics, working in the EU Flagship Human Brain Project.

Part of international collaborations

Longer hospital stays can worsen self-injurious behaviour

Can a hospital stay make the disease worse? It sounds paradoxical, but of course it can occur as a result of, for example, misdiagnosis and negligence, or of overtreatment. When it comes to psychiatric illnesses and ailments, which are often sensitive to the interaction with the environment, it can be difficult to see how the situation at the hospital affects the illness. Therefore, it is important to be attentive.

A new study by Antoinette Lundahl, carried out together with Gert Helgesson and Niklas Juth, draws attention to the problem in the care of patients who self-harm. They did a survey with healthcare staff at psychiatric clinics in Stockholm. The respondents answered questions about experiences of care longer than a week with this patient group. A majority of the respondents believed that it had detrimental effects on self-injurious behaviour if the patients stayed longer than a week in their ward. They also considered that the patients often stayed too long in the ward and that the reasons for the extended length of stay were in several cases non-medical.

How are we to understand this? How might hospitalization increase the risk of the behaviour to be treated? In the discussion part of the article, various possible explanations are suggested, for example conflicts on the ward or that patients spread self-injurious behaviours to each other. Another possible explanation is that the hospital stay is used by the patient to transfer responsibility for handling painful feelings and thoughts to others. Such avoidance strategies only have a short-term effect and increase the pain in the long term. The self-injurious behaviour can be reinforced as a way to get more care and attention. A kind of “care addiction” develops in the patient, you could say.

How should we understand the extended hospital stays? The respondents mentioned several non-medical reasons, such as uncertainty about the patient’s housing, or that patients who look fragile or are assertive influence the staff to extend the length of care. Another reason for extended care times was assumed to be doctors’ fear of being held responsible for suicide or attempted suicide after discharge, a fear which paradoxically could increase the risk.

Read Antoinette Lundahl’s article here: Hospital staff at most psychiatric clinics in Stockholm experience that patients who self-harm have too long hospital stays, with ensuing detrimental effects.

Then you can also read more about the respondents’ suggestions for improvements, such as giving patients clear care plans with fixed discharge dates, short treatment times (a few days), and information about what is expected of them during the hospital stay. Better collaboration with outpatient care was also recommended, as well as more non-medical treatments in inpatient care.

Pär Segerdahl

Written by…

Pär Segerdahl, Associate Professor at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics and editor of the Ethics Blog.

Antoinette Lundahl, Gert Helgesson & Niklas Juth (2022) Hospital staff at most psychiatric clinics in Stockholm experience that patients who self-harm have too long hospital stays, with ensuing detrimental effects, Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, 76:4, 287-294, DOI: 10.1080/08039488.2021.1965213

This post in Swedish

We have a clinical perspective

What does it mean to prioritize patients according to severity?

How should patients be prioritized in health care? In many countries’ regulations, the answer to this question is formulated in terms of severity: the more severe the illness of a patient is, the higher the patient should be prioritized. Although other things may matter for health care priorities, such as cost-effectiveness, severity should be at least one of the criteria. But what makes an illness more severe than another? How should we compare patients in terms of severity?

A recently launched research project tries to tackle these issues. The project is a collaboration between CRB and The National Centre for Priorities in Health in Sweden at Linköping University. The issue of morally sound priority setting in health care is increasingly important and pressing, not least because of the continuing development of new treatments. We can do more for patients today than ever before, but these treatments compete for the limited resources of health care.

The purpose of the project is to make the vague and contested notion of severity more normatively robust and precise by investigating moral issues related to severity. If the concept of severity is to provide valid reasons for prioritization, we must first examine what we should mean by the concept in the context of disease and health care. For instance, there are different ideas about why severity should matter in health care priorities. One idea is that being more severely ill means being worse off than others and that this inequality is something bad. Another idea is that we have stronger reasons to help people the worse off they are, that is, some idea about the moral weight of evil. These different ideas have different implications for which patients to treat first.

There are also different notions about what features of a patient or illness makes that patient more severely ill. It could be quality of life, functioning, existential suffering, or length of life. A common intuition is that an illness with a prognosis of one year survival is more severe when it affects a 20-year old person than an 80-year old person, but that there is no difference in severity when the same illness affects people only ten years apart, say a 40-year old compared to a 50-year old. Together with Borgar Jølstad, I have investigated if this intuition holds up for closer scrutiny. Our conclusion is that it is doubtful. Read our article here: Age and Illness Severity: A Case of Irrelevant Utilities?

The project also looks into economic and legal issues. One economic issue is how different notions of severity affect the total health we can get out of the health care system with a limited budget. Legally, the issue is to what extent different notions of severity are compatible with existing regulations.

This was just a brief presentation of the new project. More posts on specific issues will come when we publish our studies in journals. Hopefully we can soon propose some well-argued answers on how to prioritize patients according to severity. If you want to know more about our basic perspective on some of the issues that will be investigated further, you can read this article: Severity as a Priority Setting Criterion: Setting a Challenging Research Agenda.

Niklas Juth

Written by

Niklas Juth, Professor of Clinical Medical Ethics at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics (CRB)

Jølstad, B., & Juth, N. (2022). Age and Illness Severity: A Case of Irrelevant Utilities? Utilitas, 34(2), 209-224. doi:10.1017/S0953820822000024

Barra, M., Broqvist, M., Gustavsson, E. et al. Severity as a Priority Setting Criterion: Setting a Challenging Research Agenda. Health Care Analysis 28, 25–44 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10728-019-00371-z

This post in Swedish

We want solid foundations

The branding of psychotherapy and responsible practice

Clinical psychologists receive degrees from universities, training them to effectively apply psychotherapy programs in psychiatry settings. But after graduation, whose responsibility is it to train, or perhaps re-train, clinical psychologists to practice “proper” therapy? Is it the responsibility of the owner of a three-letter branded protocol, such as DBT (Dialectical Behavior Therapy), SFT (Schema Focused Therapy) or MBSR (Metacognition Based Stress Reduction)? Or is it the responsibility of the health care systems that provide treatment? Perhaps they should ensure that a psychologist’s training is regularly updated, as in most other clinical professions?

As a clinical psychologist myself, with experience from practice in France, I want to address some challenges that I have experienced and reflected upon as I have tried to develop my own way of practicing therapy.

Medical training updates are widely encouraged for psychiatrists via the counting of credits for attending certified courses or international conferences (Continuing Medical Education Points). However, when it comes to clinical psychologists, the psychiatrists’ side-kicks offering psychotherapy treatment, there is no such unified system. Psychotherapy is in essence social work, and the success depends on the relationship between the therapist and the patient. But in many countries, particularly in the English speaking world, there is a tendency to brand specific therapeutic programs, such as the commonly known cognitive behavioral therapy, CBT, or versions of it such as dialectic behavioral therapy, DBT. Being “branded” as a psychotherapist comes with the advantage of being recurrently involved in seminars, training and follow-ups on our practice. But as a therapist, you are offering more than a program, you are offering years of experience and training. It is neither practical nor possible to “label” every little piece of training that made your practice look the way it does now. Yet psychotherapists face an entire branding system, with names such as DBT (Dialectical Behavioral Therapy), TFT (Transference Focused Therapy), SFT (Schema Focused Therapy) and MIT (Metacognition and Insight Therapy). All these names give structure, labels to refer to, which help both patients and colleagues to identify what happens in the therapy. But at the same time we might be confusing everyone involved with a jargon of acronyms. Depending on the cultural context, even using the word “client” instead of “patient” can be seen as subversive. The very idea that psychotherapy could be branded may appear strange and unusual. Are we considering the values at stake? Might not branding shift focus, from values of care towards economic considerations (such as selling your brand)? On the surface, it looks reasonable and as an approach that supports a fair distribution of care.

As an author of a CBT protocol myself, using a much longer acronym, ECCCLORE, I have been forced to question the underlying dynamic of naming or branding a particular kind of psychotherapy.  Like most of the CBT protocols, the effectiveness is in the structure of the protocol. Although I wanted to protect that structure, I did not want to rule out potential changes or improvements, but to make the protocol open to practitioners’ own experiences of using it with their patients. Therefore, I always encourage my students and colleagues to integrate the protocol with their own experiences, strengths and discoveries along the way.

Why? Well, because in using a protocol to engage with people in the intimate setting that psychotherapy is, we must also examine our values as caregivers, always considering the ethical principles of non-malevolence, respect and justice. And just as you must find your way to practice any branded therapy, you must find your way to observe these ethical principles in your work.

I was not harming my patients with the ECCCLORE protocol, but I created something that requires training to apply. Otherwise, like any mechanically applied protocol, it could potentially harm patients. Can that risk be overcome by adding another branded sub-protocol? There are already names all over the place in the CBT world. We all use “branded skills” such as Beck’s Columns and Padesky’s Polygram, and they are free to use, but they are just names for very commonly used tools, which we must again learn to use in practice.

When you dive into the specificity of “certified programs,” things start to become even more complicated. If I did not brand my project, anyone could use (or abuse) the ECCCLORE brand. For example, in France one needs to declare intellectual property in order to protect the project or research results from being stolen (as the research outcome is not considered the intellectual property of the researcher, as it is in Sweden). This means that anyone can use the name, even if it is unrelated to the CBT framework. But by acknowledging the creator’s intellectual property, it is possible for me to brand my own research protocol and evidence-based program, preventing misuse of the methods. But is it helping the replication and dissemination of the protocol? And if my ultimate goal is to offer the protocol to help as many patients as possible, is branding it the best solution?

I sensed an affinity between my own reflections and recent research that questioned the ethical guidelines for social justice work in psychology and outlined the need for social justice ethics. When I thought about branded CBT programs, I recognized ethical risks everywhere. If you pay a lot of money to be trained in Program A, you expect to be recognized as a Program A practitioner, and you expect to benefit from the specific expertise that you earned. Is it fair then to offer such services at premium prices? Or to refuse to have Program A training delivered to most of the clinical psychologists? Does it make the program more affordable and accessible to the patients in need of it? Is a society fair where most of the latest advances are not available to everyone, but only in private practice? Well, there are of course economic considerations, but on the clinical level it is not easy to sort out the pros and cons of these “acronymized” psychotherapies.

As a treatment developer, I do recognize that having a name to identify the program really helps. The social component of psychotherapy is known to be an important effectiveness factor. This was the case also for me. Avoiding any stigmatizing name of my therapeutic group, such as “Borderline Group,” was a move toward justice, respect and non-malevolence. I decided to create the acronym together with the first patient group, which helped create motivation and reflected the collaborative process. Because in therapy, it is the patients who have the most at stake. Along the way, I also had a chance to be trained in a manual-based psychotherapy, and I saw the advantages, as a clinician, to have a tribe supporting me as I entered their group. Branded evidence-based psychotherapies are organizing trainings and conferences, which offer many resources for their practitioners. They build up more and more specific results around subgroups of patients, and take responsibility for the full functioning of their practitioners.

Branded psychotherapies are probably here to stay, but I wanted to highlight some practical and ethical challenges that I have experienced and reflected upon as a treatment developer. Let me conclude with one final consideration about the future. In recent research on the effectiveness of personality disorder psychotherapy, the main factors were found to be the therapeutic attitude (active and collaborative) and the clarity of the protocol (the underlying theories). Future research may further investigate whether the branding of psychotherapies, which can be confusing, may also contribute to these factors.

Sylvia Martin

Sylvia Martin, Clinical Psychologist and Senior Researcher at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics (CRB)

Sylvia Martin. (2022) Le programme ECCCLORE: Une nouvelle approche du trouble borderline. Deboeck Supérior.

In dialogue with patients