Tag: consent (Page 4 of 6)

Beware of the vanity of “autonomy”

26 November, 2013 / Pär Segerdahl / 0 Comments

Important words easily become totalitarian. They begin with communicating some humanly important point, so we listen with attention. But then it is as if the words suffered from vanity and assumed that our attention was directed at them; not at what they were used to say.

Over time, the words become like grammatical codes of importance in human life.

A word that underwent such a process in bioethics is autonomy. It was first used to communicate an urgency, namely, that patients and research participants must be respected. They have a right to information about what is about to happen, and to decide whether they want to undergo some treatment or participate in some experiment.

Patients and research participants have this understandable right to autonomy.

But as the word was used to communicate this urgency, the importance seemed to move into the word. If patients have a right to “autonomy,” mustn’t autonomy be a valuable trait that can be supported so that we increase the value?

Is autonomy perhaps even the most valuable aspect of the human: our characteristic when we are in our most rational state as rational animals. Perhaps autonomy is human essence?

From having been a comprehensible right, autonomy assumed the appearance of a super important value to constantly look for, like for a holy grail.

The question arose: Should we restrict people’s freedom to make own choices, if the choices threaten future autonomy?

We occasionally do disrespect people’s choices: for their sake. What I’m blogging about today is the tendency to replace “for their sake” with “for the sake of future autonomy.”

A new article in the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy deals with the question. You find the article by clicking the link below:

Paternalism in the Name of Autonomy

The article is written by Manne Sjöstrand, Stefan Eriksson, Niklas Juth and Gert Helgesson. They criticize the idea of a paternalistic policy to restrict people’s freedom in order to support their future autonomy.

The authors choose to argue from the opponent’s point of view. They thus start out from the interpretation of autonomy as super important value, and then try to show that such a policy becomes self-defeating. Future autonomy will be threatened by such a policy, much like the dictatorship of the proletariat never liberated humans but chained them to a totalitarian order.

The article is well-argued and should alert those enchanted by the word “autonomy” to the need of checking their claims.

Even though the article does not disenchant the concept of autonomy through the philosophical humor that I described in a previous post, I was struck by the tragicomedy of claiming that the ultimate reason why healthcare staff should not comply with a patient’s request for help to die is that… assisted death would destroy the patient’s autonomy.

Pär Segerdahl

Dynamic consent in biobank research: better than broad consent?

2 October, 2013 / Pär Segerdahl / 0 Comments

Biobanks make contributing to medical research easy: easier than when the research is performed on living human bodies.

I simply donate my sample and consent to storage for certain kinds of future research, under specified conditions like that the research is ethically reviewed and the sample is coded so that it cannot be traced to me without keys. I consent to a specific biobank framework.

Thereafter, the research is done on the sample and data in registers. What an easy way of contributing to research!

Too easy, it is sometimes objected. Broad consent to future research implies ethically problematic passivity among biobank participants, the objection goes. Participants are precluded from exercising fundamental rights and freedoms. Power is transferred from participants to researchers.

What’s the solution, then? An often proposed solution is familiar to all who make choices on the internet. Passive biobank participants can be activated by keeping themselves updated via a website. On this website, they give dynamic consent in real time, as researchers continually inform about proposed research with donated samples.

Dynamic consent would empower biobank participants, make them engaged in the decision-making process and equal partners in the research.

It sounds brilliant! What an easy solution! In the case of large population-based biobanks, however, it would mean that hundreds of thousands would spend the rest of their lives keeping themselves updated about planned research with samples donated perhaps decades ago, and for each new project make active choices: yes or no?

Researchers would be free to come and leave the biobank, while participants are fettered to a life-long commission as ethical gate-keepers, with their own login information.

Seduced by sugary phrases? In an article last month – Broad versus dynamic consent in biobank research – Norwegian research ethicists identify six often cited reasons in favor of a dynamic consent model for biobanks. For each cited claim, they are able to adduce reminders and considerations that make the claim notably less appetizing, at least to me.

This post would become long-winded if I informed about all objections to the claims in favor of dynamic consent: who reads long texts on the internet? Two central objections, however, are that a dynamic consent model would invite people into the therapeutic misconception and that it would individualize the ethical review of public health research.

Still, it is vital that biobanks continually inform about ongoing and planned biobank activities, making the research transparent, and giving those who might want to opt-out opportunity to do so.

Pär Segerdahl

Making the Helsinki Declaration coherent?

25 September, 2013 / Pär Segerdahl / 0 Comments

The Helsinki Declaration is under revision. One suggested change concerns a paragraph about biobank and register-based research, which states:

“For medical research using identifiable human material or data, physicians must normally seek consent for the collection, analysis, storage and/or reuse.”

The paragraph currently continues with the following exceptions:

“There may be situations where consent would be impossible or impractical to obtain for such research or would pose a threat to the validity of the research. In such situations the research may be done only after consideration and approval of a research ethics committee.” (My emphasis.)

The proposed revision is to delete the exception I emphasized. – Why? I speculate that the deletion is proposed to avoid perceived conflict with an earlier paragraph, stating that

“the well-being of the individual research participant must take precedence over all other interests.”

In particular, the interests of research must not take precedence over the interests of the participant. But it might appear as if “…or would pose a threat to the validity of the research” does just that. The phrase seems to emphasize the interests of research.

In the latest issue of Science, CRB researchers Joanna Forsberg and Yusuke Inoue question the proposal to delete the exception. In a letter, “Beware Side Effects of Research Ethics Revision,” they point out that in biobank and register-based research, risks of participation are only minimal.

Human beings are “participants” in a markedly different sense when the research is done on their data or samples, rather than on themselves or their bodies.

The authors argue that “when the risks are minimal, it is not clear that the individual’s interests in having a say should automatically outweigh the good that can result from robust research.”

I think their views should be taken seriously. There is a risk that the effort to achieve verbal consistency neglects actual distinctions between forms of medical research. If the paragraphs that seem to conflict concern markedly different forms of research and markedly different forms of participation with markedly different risks – then an important exception might be sacrificed for the sake of an only apparent conflict.

Pär Segerdahl

The specific study misconception of biobank infrastructure

5 August, 2013 / Pär Segerdahl / 0 Comments

It is comprehensible that a patient who agrees to participate in a clinical trial expects to get access to a new effective therapy that will restore health. It is comprehensible that it is difficult to convey objective, dispassionate information that such an expectation is unrealistic, given randomization and other features of clinical trials.

Participation in biobank research ought to be simpler to understand. How can you expect to get healthy by giving a blood sample and allowing future research to combine the genetic data that can be obtained from the sample with data accumulating over time in health registries? The therapeutic misconception ought to be less tempting in biobank research, making the relationship between researchers and participants more straightforward.

For this reason, I was surprised to read on the Science Codex Blog about a study indicating difficulties to understand participation in biobank research; difficulties similar to those that more comprehensibly arise for participation in clinical trials.

What surprised me even more, however, was the discussion about this finding that was quoted on the blog. The fact that participants in biobank studies cannot expect a new and better therapy was presented as a shortcoming vis-à-vis clinical trials, as if such an expectation was not a misconception. Moreover, hopes were expressed that a change is underway:

“Some new models for biobank studies are more inclusive of the research subject, offering on-going contact and return of results that may impact their health, says Dr. McBride.”

I do not exclude that such models might work for some restricted biobank studies about specific diseases, which might require on-going contact with a particular patient group to get the research done.

But biobanking is more and more about building infrastructures where samples are stored indefinitely for future research that cannot be specified in advance. Making participation in such infrastructures more like participation in specific clinical trials – supporting the therapeutic misconception where it ought to be most distant! – appears fundamentally misguided.

The infrastructural nature of modern biobanking remains to be understood. It needs to be freed from what might be termed the specific study misconception.

Pär Segerdahl

Don’t shoot at the patient (or at the messenger)

2 April, 2013 / Pär Segerdahl / 0 Comments

The newly proposed European Data Protection Directive overprotects research participants and exposes patients to greater risks of contracting illness and dying.

Thus dramatically a recent article in The Lancet Oncology can be summarized, written by Mats G. Hansson at CRB together with Gert Jan van Ommen, Ruth Chadwick and Joakim Dillner.

People who provide data to research registers are not exposed to physical risks, like participants in interventional research. The risks associated with register-based research are informational: unauthorized release of information about participants. One might ask if it even makes sense to say that people “participate in research” when researchers process large data sets.

Patients (and people in general) have significant protection from disease thanks to register-based research. For example, it is estimated that the HPV vaccine will save about 200 women from dying in cervical cancer each year, in Sweden alone. This cancer-preventive treatment became possible because researchers had access to samples dating back to the 1960s providing evidence for a causal connection between a certain virus infection and cervical cancer later in life.

Despite this vital value in biobanks and registers,
despite the fact that risks are only informational,
despite rigorous safety routines to prevent unauthorized spread of information,
despite the fact that researchers don’t study individuals but statistical patterns, and
despite the question if people really are “participants” in register-based research,

the EU committee proposing the new directive treats the integrity of “research participants” as so pivotal that researchers who process data not only must be subjected to the same ethical review process as for invasive research, but also must obtain informed consent from each and every one who once gave their data to the register, whenever the researchers want to study a new disease pattern.

Data protection efforts easily lose their sense of proportions, it seems, at least concerning register-based research. Not only is one prepared to expose patients to greater physical risks in order to protect research participants from (already rigorously controlled) informational risks.

One also is prepared to disturb data providers who hardly can be described as “participating” in research, by forcing researchers to recontact them about informed consent. Not only on one occasion, but time and again, year after year, each time a new disease pattern is explored in the registers. That’s what I call privacy intrusion!

Pär Segerdahl

No consent for maintaining high-quality health care?

21 September, 2012 / Pär Segerdahl / 0 Comments

Collecting biological samples and health information from healthy donors in the construction of biobanks and research registers obviously requires the donors’ informed consent.

But is a similar demand for consent reasonable when patients provide their doctor with samples for diagnosis, undergo medical examination and treatment, and answer the doctor’s questions? Or can patients be expected to accept that their traces in the health care system – for example, data about experienced side effects – are monitored to optimize the quality of medical diagnosis and treatment?

A recent article by Mats G. Hansson at CRB discusses the issue. The article in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics is well-argued and challenges common assumptions.

The basic argument is that quality registers and biobanks within the health care system play such a decisive role in optimizing the quality of the care that we expect as patients, that no consent should be required for collecting and studying our traces as patients (provided that the purpose is maintenance of high-quality health care, and nothing else).

Consent is associated with costs, in the form of drop-out of data. This impairs the value of the information in quality registers and biobanks, and thereby also the conditions for optimizing medical diagnosis and treatment.

Privacy is not the only ethical concern. Quality of care carries moral weight too.

Perhaps we are prepared to accept certain access to our patient histories, if such access is a precondition to maintaining and developing high standards of health care?

Pär Segerdahl

How unspecific is broad consent?

13 September, 2012 / Pär Segerdahl / 0 Comments

In response to an informative article on personalized medicine and biobanking in Nature Biotechnology, a recent letter to the Editor defends broad consent for biobanking.

The three letter writers emphasize the patient and donor perspective:

“…patient donors actually express concern that study-specific consent can be burdensome and impede research.”

Given these donors’ desire to give so-called broad consent, I want to highlight two problematic aspects of the distinction between specific and broad consent.

The first is that the word “broad” consent may give rise to the impression that the consent is so general and vague that it cannot be seen as informed consent to anything specific at all. But broad consent is not “broad” in such an absolute sense, akin to vagueness. It is “broad” only in a relative sense: in relation to the historically more prevalent case of consenting to individual research projects.

The distinction between specific and broad consent is a distinction between two ways of being specific. One of these ways of being specific dominated the scene first. It therefore functioned as a linguistic standard. The other way of being specific had to put up with being called “broad.”

Specific consent, then, is specific only in a specific sense: one that is historically conditioned and changeable. It is not the golden standard of exactitude. Consent can therefore be “broad” without being vague.

The second problematic aspect is that when people donate samples to biobanks, the exact nature of the individual research projects that might use their samples is less relevant to them than when they consent to invasive procedures in clinical trials.

The risks are minimal in biobank research. Donors therefore look more to the practical utility of the research than to the research itself. Forcing them to consider the purposes and questions and procedures of individual research projects is forcing them to attend to a level of medical research that is less relevant to them as donors.

In short, a historically and linguistically insensitive demand for “specific consent” in biobanking may hinder donors from giving the kind of specific consent they authentically want to give in this new but more and more prevalent context.

Pär Segerdahl

M	T	W	T	F	S	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31

Welcome to the Ethics Blog!

Meet the editor

Follow the Ethics Blog via e-mail

Search this site

Recent posts

Interested in the Swedish debate?

Keywords in this blog

Recent Comments