Most people know that humans are animals, a primate species. Still, it is difficult to apply that knowledge directly to oneself: “I’m an animal”; “My parents are apes.”
– Can you say it without feeling embarrassed and slightly dizzy?
In a recent paper I explore this difficulty of “bringing home” an easily cited scientific fact:
Why does the scientific “fact” crumble when we apply it directly to ourselves?
I approach this difficulty philosophically. We cannot run ahead of ourselves, but I believe that’s what we attempt if we approach the difficulty theoretically. Say, by theorizing the contrast between humans and animals as an absolute presupposition of human language that science cannot displace.
Such a theory would be as easy to cite as the “fact” and wouldn’t touch our difficulty, the dizziness we feel.
Instead, I explore a personal experience. When I visited a laboratory for ape language research, an ape named Panbanisha told me to be QUIET and later called me a MONSTER. Being reprimanded by an ape made me dizzy about my humanness and about her animality.
How did the dizziness arise? After spending some time with the apes, the vertigo disappeared. How did it disappear?
That’s investigated in the paper by asking further questions, and by recollecting aspects of the meeting with Panbanisha to which those questions drew my attention. The paper offers a philosophical alternative to theory.
Trust your uncertainty and follow your questions!