A blog from the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics (CRB)

Tag: patients (Page 4 of 5)

Is it ethical that uninformed members of the public decide just how bad your disability is? (By Terry Flynn)

Terry FlynnLast time I raised the possibility of changing child health policy because teenagers are more likely than adults to view mental health impairments as being the worst type of disability. However, today I consider adults only in order to address a more fundamental issue.

Imagine you had an uncommon, but not rare, incurable disease that caused you to suffer from both “moderate” pain and “moderate” depression and neither had responded to existing treatments. If policy makers decided there were only enough funds to try to help one of these symptoms, who decides which should get priority?

In most of Europe, perhaps surprisingly, it would not be you the patient, nor even the wider patient group suffering from this condition. It is the general population. Why? The most often quoted reason will be familiar to those who know the history of the USA: “no taxation without representation”. Tax-payers supposedly fund most health care and their views should decide where this money is most needed. If they consider pain to be worse than depression, then health services should prioritise treatment for pain.

Thus, many European countries have conducted nationally representative surveys to quantify their general public’s views on various health states. Unfortunately Swedish population values were only published last year, almost two decades after the first European country published theirs. Although late, these Swedish population values raise a disturbing issue.

Suppose the general population is wrong?

Why might this be? Many people surveyed are, and always have been, basically healthy. How do they know whether depression is better or worse than pain? In fact, these people tend to say pain would be worse, whilst patients who have experienced both say the opposite.

The Swedish general population study was large and relatively well equipped to investigate how people in ill health value disability. And, indeed, they do value it differently than the average healthy Swedish person.

So is it ethical to disenfranchise patients in order that all citizens, informed or not, have a say?

Why not use the views of patients instead?

Well actually the stated policy in Sweden is that the health values ideally should come from the individuals affected by the health intervention (patients). So Sweden now has the information required to follow its own health policy aims. Perhaps it’s time politicians were asked if it is ethical to prioritise pain over mental health, just because various general populations thought this is so.

As a final thought, I return to the issue of “what funds healthcare”? You may be surprised to learn that the “general taxation” answer is wrong here too. But that strays beyond health care and ethics and into the dark heart of economics, which I will therefore discuss elsewhere next week!

Terry Flynn

We like challenging questions - the ethics blog

The teacher as an example

PÄR SEGERDAHL Associate Professor of Philosophy and editor of The Ethics BlogTeachers want to affect their students. The intent, after all, is for students to acquire certain knowledge and skills. To achieve this, the teacher exhibits exemplars of what the students should know. The teacher talks in exemplary ways about the industrial revolution, about bioethical principles, or shows exemplars of what it means to “add 2” or what a “chemical reaction” is.

The students are then given exercises where they reproduce the exemplars in their own speech, writing and practice. Finally, they are examined. How well have they been affected by the educationally exhibited exemplars and by the exercises?

This description of the learning situation is greatly reduced. Not least because of its focus on the teaching of knowledge and skills. The teacher’s role is reduced to that of holding up exemplars of what the students should know (or be able to do).

But the teaching room contains one additional “exemplar” that is quite important: the teacher.

How does the teacher function as an exemplar? By being there as “a person who …” The teacher functions as a living example of a person who is engaged in history, in bioethics, in mathematics or in chemistry.

The teacher is an example of what one can be (historian, bioethicist …). Not just of what one should know.

The teacher’s exemplary role as “a person who…” can be problematic. Suppose that the physics teacher is a man who almost exclusively addresses the male students. He thereby shows (through his “exemplary” presence) that a physicist is (preferably) male.

Nevertheless, I submit that the teacher’s exemplary presence as “a person who …” is essential. Without it, the students become reduced. Education that puts too much emphasis on knowledge and skills may even make it exemplary that this is what an “educated person” is: A one-dimensional functionary equipped with certain knowledge and skills.

Who desires to be that? Is it even possible? Or is it to overlook what we inevitably are: living persons who…?

Pär Segerdahl

We care about education

Nurses’ experiences of do not resuscitate orders

PÄR SEGERDAHL Associate Professor of Philosophy and editor of The Ethics BlogWhen a critically ill patient has such a poor prognosis that resuscitation would be of no use, doctors can write a so-called do not resuscitate order. The decision means that if the heart stops beating, the medical team should not, as otherwise, perform coronary pulmonary rescue.

The decision is made by the physician on the basis of a medical assessment. But the decision affects the patient, the relatives, and the nurses who care for the patient and family.

Mona Pettersson at CRB is writing her thesis on the decision not to resuscitate. In a study recently published in Nursing Ethics, she interviewed 15 nurses about their experiences of do not resuscitate orders at Swedish hematology and oncology departments.

The nurses describe problems that may arise. The nurses have daily close contact with patients and notice when they are no longer responding to treatment. The nurses can then expect a do not resuscitate order, which may not always come. The decision may be taken by the doctor on the spot, when a resuscitation attempt already started. Sometimes decisions are unclear or contradictory: decisions are taken while continuing to give the patient full treatment. And if the patient and family are not informed about the decision, or the nurse is not present when the information is given, it becomes difficult for the nurse to care for the patient and family – for example, to answer questions afterwards.

Mona Pettersson concludes that nurses need clear, well-documented orders. Patients and families need to be informed and involved in the decisions, and nurses should be present when the information is provided. Finally, regular ethical discussions between nurses and doctors are needed, to understand each other and the different perspectives on do not resuscitate orders. Here you find a link to the article:

Co-authors are Mariann Hedström and Anna Höglund.

Before I finish this post, I want to mention a recently made compilation of our research on nursing ethics:

There you will find our publications with abstracts and links to the publications that are available online.

Pär Segerdahl

We have a clinical perspective : www.ethicsblog.crb.uu.se

Open biobank landscapes

PÄR SEGERDAHL Associate Professor of Philosophy and editor of The Ethics BlogLast week I wrote about the transition from organizing science as a tree of knowledge that once in a while drops its fruits onto society, to organizing research as part of knowledge landscapes, where the perspective of harvesting, managing and using the fruits is there from the beginning.

That the proud tree is gone might seem sad, but here we are – in the knowledge landscape, and I believe the development is logical. As a comment to the previous post made clear, many fruits fell from the old tree without coming into use.

The notion of knowledge landscapes sheds light on the attempt by BBMRI.se to build infrastructure for biobank research. The initiative can be viewed as an attempt to integrate research in broader knowledge landscapes. Supporting research with an eye to the interests of patients is a new way of managing research, more oriented towards the fruits and their potential value for people than in the era of the tree of knowledge.

The novelty of the infrastructural approach to biobanking isn’t always noticed. In Sweden, for example, the biobank initiative LifeGene was met with suspicion from some quarters. In the debate, some critics portrayed LifeGene as being initiated more or less in the interest of a closed group of researchers. Researchers wanted to collect samples from the population and then climb the tree and study the samples for god knows which purposes.

Those suspicions were based on the old conception of science as a high tree, inaccessible to most of us, in which researchers pursue “their own” interests. The aim with LifeGene, I believe, is rather to integrate research in a knowledge landscape, in which research is governed more by the interests of patients.

We mustn’t underestimate the challenges such a reorganization of research has to deal with, the forces that come into play. I merely want to suggest a new way of surveying and thinking about the transition – as a change from approaching science as a high tree of knowledge to integrating research in open knowledge landscapes.

If you want to read more about research in knowledge landscapes, you find Anna Lydia Svalastog’s article here, and the network where these ideas originated here.

In September 2014, the third conference, HandsOn: Biobanks, is organized, now in Helsinki. Academics, industry, doctors, patient groups, policy makers, public representatives and legislators are invited to share knowledge and experiences. As in previous conferences in the series, there is an interactive part, The Route, in which biobanking processes can be followed from start to finish, with ample opportunities for discussion.

View the conference as part of maintaining open biobank landscapes, with research as one of several integrated components.

Registration is open.

Pär Segerdahl

We like broad perspectives : www.ethicsblog.crb.uu.se

Perplexed by autonomy

PÄR SEGERDAHL Associate Professor of Philosophy and editor of The Ethics BlogDuring the seminar this week we discussed an elusive concept. The concept is supposed to be about ordinary people, but it is a concept that ordinary people hardly use about themselves.

We talked about autonomy, which is a central notion in ethical discussions about how patients and research participants should be treated. They should be respected as persons who make their own decisions on the basis of information about the options.

The significance of this is evident if we consider cases where patients are given risky treatments without being informed about the risks and given the opportunity to refuse treatment. Or cases where vulnerable persons are forced to function as research subjects in various experiments.

“Respect people’s autonomy!” is comprehensible as a slogan against such tendencies.

What makes the concept more elusive, however, is that increasingly it is used more speculatively as the name of a valuable quality in the human, perhaps even the superior and most distinctive one. Instead of functioning as a comprehensible slogan in a real context, the notion becomes utopian, demanding that individuals constantly be informed about options and making decisions.

Autonomy becomes the superior imperative in all areas of human life.

Such a totalized imperative displaces the meaning of these areas of life, for example, the meaning of health care. Health care no longer seems being primarily about treating people’s diseases (while respecting their autonomy), but as being about developing diagnoses and treatments that give individual patients more information and options to choose between.

The concept of autonomy becomes a utopian construct that does not face the real-life challenges that made the slogan comprehensible, because it aims towards an ideal solution without need of the slogan. Every human practice is turned into an arena that first of all supports autonomy.

The speculative concept is somewhat self-contradictory, however, since it is imposed paternalistically as the essence of the human, while the humans concerned hardly use it to understand themselves. Well, then we’ll have to turn them into such individuals!

No, I confess I’m quite perplexed by the utopian-intellectual refinement of otherwise comprehensible slogans like autonomy, justice and freedom. These efforts appear like the noblest efforts of humankind, and yet they run amok with our words and displace the meaning of every human practice.

Pär Segerdahl

We like real-life ethics : www.ethicsblog.crb.uu.se

Why do cancer patients participate in clinical trials?

PÄR SEGERDAHL Associate Professor of Philosophy and editor of The Ethics BlogHearsay and good intentions won’t suffice. If a new treatment is chosen for a patient with cancer, one must first have seen that the treatment is at least as efficient as the conventional treatment. And one must have looked at side effects and right dosages.

Seeing this, however, presupposes that some patients agree to test the treatment… before one has clearly seen its efficacy. This is done in so-called clinical trials arranged in phases where first side effects and dosages are studied, and finally efficacy is compared to conventional treatment.

This gives rise to questions: Why are some patients prepared not to be patients on the same conditions as other patients? Why are they prepared to test a treatment one hasn’t yet seen is most efficient?

Do they understand what they agree to participate in? Since they participate in a study of a new treatment, do they understand that in order to see its efficacy, some in the group will be given just the conventional treatment?

Tove Godskesen, PhD student at CRB, noticed that such questions were relatively unexamined in the context of Swedish clinical cancer trials. She therefore did a survey study with cancer patients in several Swedish phase 3 clinical trials (where experimental and conventional treatments are compared).

Godskesen’s study (done together with Mats G. Hansson, Peter Nygren, Karin Nordin and Ulrik Kihlbom) was recently published online in the European Journal of Cancer Care:

The article contains many interesting findings. For example, patients-participants seemed generally to have understood the information about the “seeing” that they were willing to support by not being patients quite the same way as others.

Most important and salient, however, was that patients have two main motives for participating. They hope for a cure; and they wish to help future patients.

I would like to say: Patients hope that they will be given the new treatment already and that it will turn out to be more efficient than the conventional one. And they want to help future patients get the treatment that one has seen is most efficient.

Sight and future, patient role and research participant role, hope and altruism, in complex association.

Pär Segerdahl

We have a clinical perspective : www.ethicsblog.crb.uu.se

Direct-to-consumer genetic testing: empowering people to hurt themselves?

There are two tempting pictures of the human. One is that we (ideally) are autonomous individuals who make rational choices on the basis of information. The other picture is that our individuality is coded in our DNA.

These pictures work in tandem in the marketing of direct-to-consumer genetic testing. The website of the personal genomics company, 23andMe, features their DNA “spit kit.” On the half-open lid you can read: Welcome to you.

That’s the DNA picture: Your DNA contains the information about you. For 99 dollars and a saliva sample you’ll get to know who you are.

If you click Order now, you encounter the other picture: Knowledge is power. By buying this product, you’ll be empowered to better manage your health and wellness. You’ll get information about diseases you risk developing and diseases you are less likely developing, and can plan your life accordingly.

That’s the autonomy picture: You are the driver of your life. For 99 dollars and a saliva sample, you are empowered as rational decision-maker about your health.

The combination of the two pictures is a powerful marketing campaign that can be followed on YouTube.

The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recently sent a warning letter to 23andMe, urging them to immediately stop marketing the test. The device isn’t just any commercial product, but is to be seen as medical technology. This implies certain quality standards:

  • “…we still do not have any assurance that the firm has analytically or clinically validated the PGS for its intended uses…”

FDA also expresses concern about public health consequences if the test doesn’t work reliably. A false positive risk assessment for breast or ovarian cancer “could lead a patient to undergo prophylactic surgery, chemoprevention, intensive screening, or other morbidity-inducing actions, while a false negative could result in a failure to recognize an actual risk that may exist.”

Another concern is that patients who receive assessments of their personal drug responses may begin to self-manage their doses or abandon their therapies.

Genetic tests will no doubt play significant roles in the future. But genetic risk information is tremendously complex and its predictive value difficult to assess. The danger is that the deceptively simple marketing rhetoric of empowering individuals to take charge of their lives currently rather might empower people to hurt themselves.

The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences decided this autumn to support a joint European research program on genetic risk information. The program is led by Mats G. Hansson at CRB. Click the link below for a summary of the program:

FDA’s warning letter to 23andMe underlines the timeliness of the new program. More on this in the future!

Pär Segerdahl

Following the news - the ethics blog

Beware of the vanity of “autonomy”

Important words easily become totalitarian. They begin with communicating some humanly important point, so we listen with attention. But then it is as if the words suffered from vanity and assumed that our attention was directed at them; not at what they were used to say.

Over time, the words become like grammatical codes of importance in human life.

A word that underwent such a process in bioethics is autonomy. It was first used to communicate an urgency, namely, that patients and research participants must be respected. They have a right to information about what is about to happen, and to decide whether they want to undergo some treatment or participate in some experiment.

Patients and research participants have this understandable right to autonomy.

But as the word was used to communicate this urgency, the importance seemed to move into the word. If patients have a right to “autonomy,” mustn’t autonomy be a valuable trait that can be supported so that we increase the value?

Is autonomy perhaps even the most valuable aspect of the human: our characteristic when we are in our most rational state as rational animals. Perhaps autonomy is human essence?

From having been a comprehensible right, autonomy assumed the appearance of a super important value to constantly look for, like for a holy grail.

The question arose: Should we restrict people’s freedom to make own choices, if the choices threaten future autonomy?

We occasionally do disrespect people’s choices: for their sake. What I’m blogging about today is the tendency to replace “for their sake” with “for the sake of future autonomy.”

A new article in the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy deals with the question. You find the article by clicking the link below:

The article is written by Manne Sjöstrand, Stefan Eriksson, Niklas Juth and Gert Helgesson. They criticize the idea of a paternalistic policy to restrict people’s freedom in order to support their future autonomy.

The authors choose to argue from the opponent’s point of view. They thus start out from the interpretation of autonomy as super important value, and then try to show that such a policy becomes self-defeating. Future autonomy will be threatened by such a policy, much like the dictatorship of the proletariat never liberated humans but chained them to a totalitarian order.

The article is well-argued and should alert those enchanted by the word “autonomy” to the need of checking their claims.

Even though the article does not disenchant the concept of autonomy through the philosophical humor that I described in a previous post, I was struck by the tragicomedy of claiming that the ultimate reason why healthcare staff should not comply with a patient’s request for help to die is that… assisted death would destroy the patient’s autonomy.

Pär Segerdahl

Minding our language - the Ethics Blog

Questionable questionnaires

Questionnaires are increasingly frequent in bioethics. They can provide information about how ethical issues are real for the parties concerned: for patients, for families, for nurses, for physicians, for research participants, for donors…

Questionnaires can counteract professional isolationism where bioethicists believe they know exactly which issues should concern people, and on the basis of this “expertise” export ethical policies without importing impressions.

Unfortunately, isolationism isn’t that easily remedied. Kevin P. Weinfurt warns that questionnaires can conceal isolationism, if responses are interpreted by bioethicists who have other points of view and other linguistic habits than the respondents.

Interpretations are easily biased to speak to issues internal to the bioethical debate. You find Weinfurt’s warnings here:

How can ethicists’ points of view bias interpretations? By asking THEIR questions as if every human housed a bioethicist experiencing the same issues. Concerning clinical trials, for example, bioethicists estimate “chance of benefit from experimental therapy.” Thus, it is natural for them to query research participants how THEY consider their chance of benefit, as if participants too perceived the situation as a decision tree with chances of disease control and risks of death.

How can ethicists’ linguistic habits bias the answers? By being so thoroughly trained in a bookish scholarly culture that they interpret people literally. If a respondent answers the question,

  • “How confident are you that the experimental therapy will control your cancer?”

by encircling 80 %, they believe that the respondent DESCRIBES his private assessment of the probability. But communication does not consist only in describing inner mental states. People DO a great number of things with words, for example, they VOICE HOPE.

When a respondent who answered 80 % afterwards was interviewed about why other people would answer 10 %, he didn’t answer in terms of divergent prognostic factors, but said:

  • “Oh, man, I feel sorry for them… They’re just not…they’re just…they’re hopeless. They have no hope left. For some reason, they’ve been beat down so bad that they can’t think positive anymore… Maybe they don’t have the same kind of support in their life that I do.”

If Weinfurt’s warnings are right, assuming that patients’ hope of recovery causes unrealistic assessments of chance of benefit may be a misconception. Patients may not make such assessments at all. It is the questionnaire that causes the illusion.

They voice their hope, that’s all.

Pär Segerdahl

In dialogue with patients

The specific study misconception of biobank infrastructure

It is comprehensible that a patient who agrees to participate in a clinical trial expects to get access to a new effective therapy that will restore health. It is comprehensible that it is difficult to convey objective, dispassionate information that such an expectation is unrealistic, given randomization and other features of clinical trials.

Participation in biobank research ought to be simpler to understand. How can you expect to get healthy by giving a blood sample and allowing future research to combine the genetic data that can be obtained from the sample with data accumulating over time in health registries? The therapeutic misconception ought to be less tempting in biobank research, making the relationship between researchers and participants more straightforward.

For this reason, I was surprised to read on the Science Codex Blog about a study indicating difficulties to understand participation in biobank research; difficulties similar to those that more comprehensibly arise for participation in clinical trials.

What surprised me even more, however, was the discussion about this finding that was quoted on the blog. The fact that participants in biobank studies cannot expect a new and better therapy was presented as a shortcoming vis-à-vis clinical trials, as if such an expectation was not a misconception. Moreover, hopes were expressed that a change is underway:

  • “Some new models for biobank studies are more inclusive of the research subject, offering on-going contact and return of results that may impact their health, says Dr. McBride.”

I do not exclude that such models might work for some restricted biobank studies about specific diseases, which might require on-going contact with a particular patient group to get the research done.

But biobanking is more and more about building infrastructures where samples are stored indefinitely for future research that cannot be specified in advance. Making participation in such infrastructures more like participation in specific clinical trials – supporting the therapeutic misconception where it ought to be most distant! – appears fundamentally misguided.

The infrastructural nature of modern biobanking remains to be understood. It needs to be freed from what might be termed the specific study misconception.

Pär Segerdahl

We challenge habits of thought : the Ethics Blog

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