A blog from the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics (CRB)

Tag: patient-nurse relationship

Does knowing the patient make a moral difference?

Several ethical concepts and principles govern how patients should be treated in healthcare. For example, healthcare professionals should respect patients’ autonomy. Moreover, they should act in the patients’ best interest and avoid actions that can cause harm. Patients must also be treated fairly. However, exactly how such ethical concepts and principles should be applied can vary in different situations.

A new article examines whether the application may depend on whether the healthcare personnel know the patient (in the sense of having knowledge about the patient). Some healthcare situations are characterized by the fact that the patient is unknown to the personnel: they have never met the patient before. Other situations are characterized by familiarity: the personnel have had continuous contact with the patient for a long time. In the latter situations, the personnel know the patient’s personality, living conditions, preferences and needs. Does such familiarity with the patient make any difference to how patients should be treated ethically by the healthcare staff, ask the authors of the article, Joar Björk and Anna Hirsch.

It may be tempting to reply that knowing the patient should not be allowed to play any role, that it follows from the principle of justice that familiarity should not be allowed to make any difference. Of course, the principle of justice places limits on the importance of familiarity with the patient. But in healthcare there is still this difference between situations marked by unfamiliarity and situations marked by familiarity. Consider the difference between screening and palliative home care. Should not this difference sometimes make a moral difference?

Presumably familiarity can sometimes make a moral difference, the authors argue. They give examples of how, not least, autonomy can take different forms depending on whether the situation is characterized by familiarity or unfamiliarity. Take the question of when and how patients should be allowed to delegate their decision-making to the healthcare personnel. If the personnel do not know the patient at all, it seems to be at odds with autonomy to take over the patient’s decision-making, even if the patient wishes it. However, if the personnel are well acquainted with the patient, it may be more consistent with autonomy to take over parts of the decision-making, if the patient so wishes. The authors provide additional examples. Suppose a patient has asked not to be informed prior to treatment, but the staff know the patient well and know that a certain part of the information could make this particular patient want to change certain decisions about the treatment. Would it then not be ethically correct to give the patient at least that part of the information and problematic not to do so? Or suppose a patient begins to change their preferences back and forth. If the patient is unfamiliar to the staff, it may be correct to always let the most recent preference apply. (One may not even be aware that the patient had other preferences before.) If, on the other hand, the patient is well known, the staff may have to take into account both past and present preferences and make a more global assessment of the changes and of autonomy.

The authors also exemplify how the application of other moral concepts and principles can take different forms, depending on whether the relationship with the patient is characterized by familiarity or unfamiliarity. Even the principle of justice could in some cases take different form, depending on whether the personnel know the patient or not, they suggest. If you want to see a possible example of this, read the article here: An “ethics of strangers”? On knowing the patient in clinical ethics.

The authors finally argue that care decisions regarding autonomy, justice and acting in the best interest of the patient are probably made with greater precision if the personnel know the patient well. They argue that healthcare professionals therefore should strive to get to know their patients. They also argue that healthcare systems where a greater proportion of the staff know a greater proportion of the patients are preferable from an ethical point of view, for example systems that promote therapeutic continuity.

Pär Segerdahl

Written by…

Pär Segerdahl, Associate Professor at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics and editor of the Ethics Blog.

Björk, J., Hirsch, A. An “ethics of strangers”? On knowing the patient in clinical ethics. Med Health Care and Philosophy 27, 389–397 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-024-10213-y

This post in Swedish

We have a clinical perspective

We need to care about care ethics

At some point in our lives, we will all need to be cared for. When that happens, it is of course crucial that the people who care for us have the medical competence and skills required to diagnose and treat us. But we also need professional care to be nursed back to health. Providing care requires both medical and ethical skills, for example when weighing risks against the benefits of treatment and when giving information or encouraging patients to follow advice and instructions. Patients also need to be given tools and space to exercise their autonomy when making decisions about their own treatment and care. As a researcher in care ethics, this is the kind of questions that I ponder: questions that matter to us throughout life. The one who brings us into this world will need care during pregnancy, birth and after delivering the baby. Newborns, premature babies and children that are injured during birth need to be cared for, together with their families. As a child, you might have an ear infection, or need patching up after falling off your bike. As adults, illness will visit us on several occasions, and being cared for at the end of life is of utmost importance. We often face difficult choices in relation to health, sickness and treatment and need support from health care professionals in order to make autonomous decisions. Care ethics encompasses all of these ethical dilemmas.

The ethical aspects of the encounter between the health care professional and the patient are at the centre of care ethics. This encounter is always asymmetrical. How can we make it a respectful encounter, given that professionals have more knowledge and patients are put in a dependent and exposed position? As individual patients in health care, we are not on home ground, while the health care professional is in a familiar work environment and practices their profession. This asymmetry places great ethical demands on how the meeting between patient and professional takes place. It is precisely in this encounter that the dilemmas of health care ethics arise. However, as a care ethics researcher, I also ask questions about how health care is organised and whether that enables good and ethically acceptable encounters.

Those who organise the health care system and the people providing care need to know something about what is best for the patient. To be able to offer concrete guidance on how to educate, budget, plan and perform care, the ethical dilemmas that arise in health care encounters need to be examined in a structured way. Care ethics offers both theoretical and empirical tools to do just that. The theoretical framework builds in part on traditional principle-based ethics, and in part on the ethics of care. In this tradition, nursing and care are seen as both value and practice. The practice includes moral values, but also gives rise to norms that can guide moral action by rejecting acts of violence and dominance towards other human beings. The ethics of care looks to the needs of the “concrete other.” It considers us as individuals in mutually dependent relationships with one another. It also ascribes emotions a moral value. But not just any emotions; mainly those that are connected to nursing and caring for others, for example compassion and empathy.

Over the years, the care ethics group at the Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics (CRB) have worked with several different questions. Mona Petterson wrote her PhD thesis on how doctors and nurses view do-not-resuscitate orders. Amal Matar’s thesis covered ethical issues in relation to genetic screening before pregnancy, also known as preconception genetic screening. We have also worked with caregivers’ experiences of health care prioritization, how parents and children view vaccination ethics, and equal access to health care. Our approach to care ethics is rooted in clinical practice and our studies are mainly informed by empirical ethics, where ethical and philosophical reasoning is related to qualitative and quantitative empirical research. Our goal is to contribute concrete clinical guidance on how to manage the ethical dilemmas that health care is faced with. Given the fact that we are all born, and live and die, it is also a given that we all will require care at one point or another. In order to enable health care policy makers and administrators to make decisions that benefit patients, talking about ethics in terms of medical risk versus benefit is not enough. As patients, we are human beings in an asymmetrical relationship where we are dependent on the person offering us care. The ethical dilemmas that arise from that relationship matter for how we perceive the treatment and care we receive. They also affect the extent to which we can exercise our autonomy.

Anna T. Höglund

Written by…

Anna T. Höglund, who is Professor of Care Ethics and Gender Studies at Uppsala University’s Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics.

This post in Swedish

In dialogue with patients

Nurses’ experiences of do not resuscitate orders

PÄR SEGERDAHL Associate Professor of Philosophy and editor of The Ethics BlogWhen a critically ill patient has such a poor prognosis that resuscitation would be of no use, doctors can write a so-called do not resuscitate order. The decision means that if the heart stops beating, the medical team should not, as otherwise, perform coronary pulmonary rescue.

The decision is made by the physician on the basis of a medical assessment. But the decision affects the patient, the relatives, and the nurses who care for the patient and family.

Mona Pettersson at CRB is writing her thesis on the decision not to resuscitate. In a study recently published in Nursing Ethics, she interviewed 15 nurses about their experiences of do not resuscitate orders at Swedish hematology and oncology departments.

The nurses describe problems that may arise. The nurses have daily close contact with patients and notice when they are no longer responding to treatment. The nurses can then expect a do not resuscitate order, which may not always come. The decision may be taken by the doctor on the spot, when a resuscitation attempt already started. Sometimes decisions are unclear or contradictory: decisions are taken while continuing to give the patient full treatment. And if the patient and family are not informed about the decision, or the nurse is not present when the information is given, it becomes difficult for the nurse to care for the patient and family – for example, to answer questions afterwards.

Mona Pettersson concludes that nurses need clear, well-documented orders. Patients and families need to be informed and involved in the decisions, and nurses should be present when the information is provided. Finally, regular ethical discussions between nurses and doctors are needed, to understand each other and the different perspectives on do not resuscitate orders. Here you find a link to the article:

Co-authors are Mariann Hedström and Anna Höglund.

Before I finish this post, I want to mention a recently made compilation of our research on nursing ethics:

There you will find our publications with abstracts and links to the publications that are available online.

Pär Segerdahl

We have a clinical perspective : www.ethicsblog.crb.uu.se