A research blog from the Centre for Resarch Ethics & Bioethics (CRB)

Category: In the research debate (Page 20 of 37)

Genetic risk: Should researchers let people know?

Should researchers inform research participants if they happen to discover individual genetic risks of disease? Yes, many would say, if the information is helpful to the participants. However, the value of complex genetic risk information for individuals is uncertain. Jennifer Viberg Johansson suggests that this uncertainty needs to be acknowledged by both geneticists and ethicists.

One reason people want to participate in large genetic studies is the comprehensive health checks researchers often offer to collect data. In the future, people could also be offered information about genetic risks. According to Jennifer Viberg Johansson, there are some factors researchers should consider before offering these kinds of results.

Providing genetic risk information may not be as helpful to individuals as one may think. Knowing your genetic make-up is not the same as knowing your own probability for disease. In addition, the genetic risk information from research is not based on symptoms or personal concerns, as it would be in the healthcare system. It is thus less “personalised” and not connected to any symptoms.

Genetic risk information is complex and can be difficult to understand. To the research participants interviewed by Jennifer Viberg Johansson, risk information is something that offers them an explanation of who they are, where they are from, and where they may be heading. To them, learning about their genetic risk is an opportunity to plan their lives and take precautions to prevent disease.

Whether research participants want genetic risk information or not is more complex. Research participants themselves may change their answer depending on the way the question is asked. Risk research shows that we interpret probabilities differently, depending on the outcome and consequences. Jennifer Viberg Johansson’s work points in the same direction: probability is not an essential component of people’s decision-making when there are ways to prevent disease.

People have difficulties making sense of genetic risk when it is presented in the traditional numeric sense. It is hard to interpret what it means to have a 10 per cent or 50 per cent risk of disease. Instead, we interpret genetic risk as a binary concept: you either have risk, or you don’t. Based on her results, Jennifer Viberg Johansson suggests we keep this in mind for genetic counselling. We need to tailor counselling to people’s often binary perceptions of risk.

Communicating risk is difficult, and requires genetic counsellors to understand how different people understand the same figures in different ways.

Jennifer Viberg Johansson defended her dissertation September 21, 2018.

Anna Holm

Viberg Johansson J., (2018), INDIVIDUAL GENETIC RESEARCH RESULTS – Uncertainties, Conceptions, and Preferences, Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis

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What does the order of authors mean?

Pär SegerdahlHow should we interpret the sequence of author names in academic publications? Does it inform us about how much each author contributed to the publication?

After reading an article on the topic by Gert Helgesson and Stefan Eriksson, I realize that authorship order is a very disorderly matter. The first and last positions are often counted as the most important. But not always. To my surprise, not even a first position necessarily signifies first authorship. Sometimes, the asterisk after the author whose contact details are given is interpreted as a sign of first authorship. Sometimes the asterisk means that this author is subordinate and handles all practicalities associated with the publication.

Sometimes the second position is of particular importance. Sometimes not. Sometimes the next to last position has a particular interpretation. Sometimes another. Helgesson and Eriksson talk about group traditions and describe conventions in different scientific fields. Are there really no guidelines to follow? No, actually not. Author guidelines at most recommend authors to agree well in advance on the order of authors. However, since the guidelines do not specify what the order signifies, the meaning of the agreed upon authorship order is unclear!

Considering how meritorious authorship is in academic competition for positions and grants, this lack of order is surprising. Is the question too sensitive? Will an overly clear order lead to time-consuming quarrels between authors about who should stand first, last, second place, second to last, with asterisk, without asterisk, and so forth?

Helgesson and Eriksson discuss different proposals for clarifying authorship order. One proposal they encountered is that the first and last positions each render 40% of the total value of the paper. The remaining 20% ​​is shared equally by the authors in the intermediate positions. For five authors, authorship value would thus be divided: 40, 6.7, 6.7, 6.7 and 40%. This type of proposal is dismissed, because fixed values ​​would be fair only if work efforts actually happened to be distributed just that way (which is unlikely).

A more flexible system could be to provide actual percentages, on a case-by-case basis. But how are actual percentages determined? Different authors contribute qualitatively differently: by designing the study; by analyzing data; by drafting the paper. What kind of contribution has most weight?

Another suggestion is not to assign a relative value to the authors’ contributions. Instead, one specifies what each one contributed. Contributorship instead of authorship, where the contribution is described in absolute terms rather than relative. For example: “contributed to designing the study,” “contributed to data analysis,” “contributed to drafting the paper.” A problem with this proposal, Helgesson and Eriksson point out, is that it in fact says very little about absolute contributions. “Contributed to designing the study” can mean both substantial and lightweight contributions.

The article ends by taking a step back. For perhaps we took a step in the wrong direction when we required a more orderly authorship order? The problem about the meaning of the sequence of author names presupposes an individualistic and competitive outlook on science. Today, there are also other tendencies, which may be more worthwhile, such as striving to make science open and socially responsive. Perhaps we should avoid attaching too much importance to authorship order?

Should our focus be on collective contributions to science, with and for society, rather than on individual merit ​​in the competition for employment and funding?

Thus the article ends, with a question calling for more contemplation.

Pär Segerdahl

Helgesson, G. & Eriksson, S. Authorship order. Learned Publishing, 2018, doi: 10.1002/leap1191

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Nurses’ vulnerable position when care and research coincide

Pär SegerdahlA new article highlights ethical challenges that nurses face in their profession when more and more clinical trials are conducted on cancer patients.

Nursing alone is stressful. Studies have shown how heavy workload and being pressed for time can cause moral blindness and emotional immunization among nurses. In clinical trials, the situation is even more complicated, due to dual professional roles. The nurses have to accommodate both the values of care and the values of research. Caring for cancer patients coincides with recruiting patients as research participants and coordinating clinical trials on them according to detailed research protocols.

The article by Tove Godskesen et al. describes challenges faced by nurses burdened with this dual professional identity. The most difficult challenges concern cancer patients near the end of life, who no longer respond to the standard therapy. They often hope desperately that research participation will give them access to the next generation of cancer drugs, which may work more efficiently on them. This unrealistic hope creates difficulties for the nurses. They must recruit cancer patients to clinical trials, while the patients often are so terminally ill that they, from a perspective of caring, perhaps rather should be allowed to end their lives in peace and quiet.

An additional complication, next to the heavy workload in nursing and the dual identity as a nurse in the service of research, is that the number of clinical trials increases. There is a political ambition to accelerate the development, to support the Nordic pharmaceutical industry. This means that more and more nurses are engaged to coordinate trials: a task for which they rarely were trained, for which they hardly have time to prepare, and over which they lack power, given their position in the hierarchy of healthcare.

In view of the political ambition to increase the number of clinical trials, there should be a corresponding ambition to support the increasing number of nurses who will have to assume dual professional roles. Godskesen’s study indicates that there is a lack of systematic strategies to handle the situation. Nurses who coordinate trials on patients support each other, to the best of their abilities, over a quick cup of coffee.

Godskesen recommends more strategic training and better support for nurses working with clinical trials. For the nurses’ sake, and not least for the sake of patient safety.

Pär Segerdahl

Tove E. Godskesen, Suzanne Petri, Stefan Eriksson, Arja Halkoaho, Margrete Mangset, Merja Pirinen, Zandra Engelbak Nielsen. 2018. When Nursing Care and Clinical Trials Coincide: A Qualitative Study of the Views of Nordic Oncology and Hematology Nurses on Ethical Work Challenges. Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics. doi.org/10.1177/1556264618783555

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Ethical competence for the decision not to resuscitate

Pär SegerdahlSometimes, physicians have to decide that a cancer patient has such a poor prognosis that he or she should not be resuscitated through cardiopulmonary rescue, if discovered with cardiac arrest. The procedure is violent and would in these cases cause unnecessary suffering.

The situation is stressful for the healthcare team no matter which decision is taken. Providing violent cardiopulmonary rescue to a terminally ill cancer patient can be perceived as poor care at the end of life. At the same time, one wishes of course to treat the patient, so the decision to not resuscitate can be stressful, too. The decision requires ethical competence.

Mona Pettersson, PhD student at CRB, examines in her dissertation the decision not to resuscitate patients in the fields of oncology and hematology. In an article in BMC Medical Ethics, she describes physicians and nurses’ reflections on ethical competence in relation to the decision not to resuscitate. Even if the physician takes the decision, the nurses are involved in the highest degree. They have responsibility for the care of the patient and of the relatives.

The ethical difficulties concern not just the decision itself. The difficulties also concern how patients and relatives are informed about the decision, as well as how the entire healthcare team is informed, involved and functions. What competence is required to ethically handle this care decision? How can such ethical competence be supported?

According to Pettersson, ethical competence involves both personal qualities and knowledge, as well as ability to reflect on how decisions best are made and implemented. In practice, all this interacts. For example, a physician may have knowledge that the patient should be informed about the decision not to resuscitate. At the same time, after reflection, the physician may choose not to inform, or choose to inform the patient using other words.

The physicians and nurses in Mona Pettersson’s study expressed that their ethical competence would be supported by greater opportunities for reflection and discussion of ethics near the end of life within oncology and hematology. This is because healthcare is always situated. The ethical difficulties have a definite context. Healthcare professionals are not ethically competent in general. Their ethical competence is linked to their specific professional practices, which moreover differ for physicians and nurses.

If you want to read more about Mona Pettersson’s dissertation, please read the presentation of her at CRB’s website: Healthcare, ethics and resuscitation.

Pär Segerdahl

Pettersson, M., Hedström. M and Höglund, A. T. Ethical competence in DNR decisions – a qualitative study of Swedish physicians and nurses working in hematology and oncology care. BMC Medical Ethics (2018) 19:63. htdoi.org/10.1186/s12910-018-0300-7

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Philosophy in responsible research and innovation

Pär SegerdahlThe honorable discipline philosophy is hardly anything we associate with groundbreaking research and innovation. Perhaps it is time we began to see a connection.

To begin with, we can let go of the image of philosophy as an honorable discipline. Instead, let us talk about the spirit of philosophy. People who think for themselves, as philosophers do, rarely find themselves at home within the narrow bounds of disciplines and fields. Not even if they are called philosophical. On the contrary, if such a person encounters boundaries that restrict her thought, she investigates the boundaries. And removes them, if necessary.

Forget the reverent representation of philosophy as an honorable discipline.

The spirit of philosophy is to avoid discipline, submission, tradition and all forms of dependence. Someone who functions as a loyal representative of a philosophical school is hardly a genuine thinker. A philosopher is someone who, in a spirit of absolute independence, questions everything that makes a pretense of being true, right and correct. Therefore, it has been said that one cannot learn philosophy, only to philosophize. As soon as a philosophy crystallizes, the philosophical spirit awakens and investigates the boundaries of what usually turns out to be a fad that attracts insecure intellects who shun independent thinking. No system of thought restricts a freely investigating thinker. Especially not the philosophy that is in fashion.

How does this spirit of philosophy connect to research and innovation? The connection I see is different than you probably guess. It is not about boosting the development by removing all boundaries, but about taking responsibility for the development. Philosophical thinking does not resemble an overheated research field’s fast flow of ideas, or an entrepreneur’s grandiose visions for the future. On the contrary, a philosopher takes a step back to calmly investigate the flow of ideas and visions.

Philosophy’s freedom is basically a responsibility.

Responsible Research and Innovation has become an important political theme for the European Commission. This responsibility is understood as an interactive process that engages social actors, researchers and innovators. Together, they are supposed to work towards ethically permissible research activities and products. This presupposes addressing also underlying societal visions, norms and priorities.

For this to work, however, separate actors cannot propagate separate interests. You need to take a step back and make yourself independent of your own special interests. You need to make yourself independent of yourself! Reflect more open-mindedly than you were disciplined to function, and see beyond the bounds of your fragmentary little field (and self). This spacious spirit of philosophy needs to be awakened: the freedom of thought that is basically the responsibility of thought.

Concrete examples of what this means are given in the journal, Neuroethics. In an article, Arleen Salles, Kathinka Evers and Michele Farisco describe the role that philosophical reflection currently plays in the European Flagship, the Human Brain Project. Here, philosophy and neuroethics are no mere appendages of neuroscientific research. On the contrary, by reflecting on central concepts in the project, philosophers contribute to the overall self-understanding in the project. Not by imposing philosophy as a special interest, or as a competing discipline with its own concepts, but by open-mindedly reflecting on neuroscientific concepts, clarifying the questions they give rise to.

The authors describe three areas where philosophy contributes within the Human Brain Project, precisely through awakening the spirit of philosophy. First, conceptual questions about connections between the brain and human identity. Secondly, conceptual questions about connections between the brain and consciousness; and between consciousness and unconsciousness. Thirdly, conceptual questions about links between neuroscientific research and political initiatives, such as poverty reduction.

Let us drop the image of philosophy as a discipline. For we need the spirit of philosophy.

Pär Segerdahl

Salles, A., Evers, K. & Farisco, M. Neuroethics (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-018-9372-9

(By the way, anyone can philosophize. If you have the spirit, you are a philosopher. A demanding education in philosophy as a separate discipline can actually be an obstacle that you have to overcome.)

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Intellectual asceticism

Pär SegerdahlWe dismiss the magician’s claim to be in touch with the spirit world. We dismiss the priest’s claim to be in touch with the divine. We do not believe in supernatural contact with a purer world beyond this one!

Nevertheless, similar claims permeate our enlightened rationalist tradition. Even philosophers promised contact with a purer sphere. The difference is that they described the pure sphere in intellectual terms. The promised control of “concepts,” “categories,” “principles” and so on. They lived, like monks and magicians, as ascetics. They sought power over life itself, but they did it through intellectual self-discipline.

If you want to think about asceticism as a trait of our philosophical tradition, you may want to take a look at an article I wrote: Intellectual asceticism and hatred of the human, the animal, and the material.

In the article, I try to show that philosophy’s infamous anthropocentrism is illusory. Philosophers never idealized the human. They idealized something much more exclusive. They idealized the ascetically purified intellect.

Pär Segerdahl

Segerdahl, P. 2018. Intellectual asceticism and hatred of the human, the animal, and the material. Nordic Wittgenstein Review 7 (1): 43-58. DOI 10.15845/nwr.v7i1.3494

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Driverless car ethics

Pär SegerdahlSelf-driving robot cars are controlled by computer programs with huge amounts of traffic rules. But in traffic, not everything happens smoothly according to the rules. Suddenly a child runs out on the road. Two people try to help a cyclist who collapsed on the road. A motorist tries to make a U-turn on a too narrow road and is stuck, blocking the traffic.

Assuming that the robots’ programs are able to categorize traffic situations through image information from the cars’ cameras, the programs must select the appropriate driving behavior for the robot cars. Should the cars override important traffic rules by, for example, steering onto the sidewalk?

It is more complicated than that. Suppose that an adult is standing on the sidewalk. Should the adult’s life be compromised to save the child? Or to save the cyclist and the two helpful persons?

The designers of self-driving cars have a difficult task. They must program the cars’ choice of driving behavior in ethically complex situations that we call unexpected, but the engineers have to anticipate far in advance. They must already at the factory determine how the car model will behave in future “unexpected” traffic situations. Maybe ten years later. (I assume the software is not updated, but also updated software anticipates what we normally see as unexpected events.)

On a societal level, one now tries to agree on ethical guidelines for how future robot cars should behave in tragic traffic situations where it may not be possible to completely avoid injuries or fatal casualties. A commission initiated by the German Ministry for Transportation, for example, suggests that passengers of robot cars should never be sacrificed to save a larger number of lives in the traffic situation.

Who, by the way, would buy a robot car that is programmed to sacrifice one’s life? Who would choose such a driverless taxi? Yet, as drivers we may be prepared to sacrifice ourselves in unexpected traffic situations. Some researchers decided to investigate the matter. You can read about their study in ScienceDaily, or read the research article in Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience.

The researchers used Virtual Reality (VR) technology to expose subjects to ethically difficult traffic situations. Thereafter, they studied the subjects’ choice of traffic behavior. The researchers found that the subjects were surprisingly willing to sacrifice themselves to save others. But they also took into consideration the age of potential victims and were prepared to steer onto the sidewalk to minimize the number of traffic victims. This is contrary to norms that we hold important in society, such as the idea that age discrimination should not occur and that the lives of innocent people should be protected.

In short, humans are inclined to drive their cars politically incorrectly!

Why was the study done? As far as I understand, because the current discussion about ethical guidelines does not take into account empirical data on how living drivers are inclined to drive their cars in ethically difficult traffic situations. The robot cars will make ethical decisions that can make the owners of the cars dissatisfied with their cars; morally dissatisfied!

The researchers do not advocate that driverless cars should respond to ethically complex traffic situations as living people do. However, the discussion about driverless car ethics should take into account data on how living people are inclined to drive their cars in traffic situations where it may not be possible to avoid accidents.

Let me complement the empirical study with some philosophical reflections. What strikes me when I read about driverless car ethics is that “the unexpected” disappears as a living reality. A living driver who tries to handle a sudden traffic situation manages what very obviously is happening right now. The driverless car, on the other hand, takes decisions that tick automatically, as predetermined as any other decision, like stopping at a red light. Driverless car ethics is just additional software that the robot car is equipped with at the factory (or when updating the software).

What are the consequences?

A living driver who suddenly ends up in a difficult traffic situation is confronted – as I said – with what is happening right now. The driver may have to bear responsibility for his actions in this intense moment during the rest of his life. Even if the driver rationally sacrifices one life to save ten, the driver will bear the burden of this one death; dream about it, think about it. And if the driver makes a stupid decision that takes more lives than it saves, it may still be possible to reconcile with it, because the situation was so unexpected.

This does not apply, however, to the robot car that was programmed at the factory according to guidelines from the National Road Administration. We might want to say that the robot car was preprogrammed to sacrifice our sister’s life, when she stood innocently on the sidewalk. Had the car been driven by a living person, we would have been angry with the driver. But after some time, we might be able to start reconciling with the driver’s behavior. Because it was such an unexpected situation. And the driver is suffering from his actions.

However, if it had been a driverless car that worked perfectly according to the manufacturer’s programs and the authorities’ recommendations, then we might see it as a scandal that the car was preprogrammed to steer onto the sidewalk, where our sister stood.

One argument for driverless cars is that, by minimizing the human factor, they can reduce the number of traffic accidents. Perhaps they can. But maybe we are less accepting as to how they are programmed to save lives in ethically difficult situations. Not only are they preprogrammed so that “the unexpected” disappears as a reality. They do not bear the responsibility that living people are forced to bear, even for their rational decisions.

Well, we will probably find ways to implement and accept the use of driverless cars. But another question still concerns me. If the present moment disappears as a living reality in the ethics software of driverless cars, has it not already disappeared in the ethics that prescribes right and wrong for us living people?

Pär Segerdahl

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Can neuroscience and moral education be united? (By Daniel Pallarés Domínguez)

Daniel Pallarés DomínguezPeople have started to talk about neuroeducation, but what is it? Is it just another example of the fashion of adding the prefix neuro- to the social sciences, like neuroethics, neuropolitics, neuromarketing and neurolaw?

Those who remain sceptical consider it a mistake to link neuroscience with education. However, for some authors, neuroscience can provide useful knowledge about the brain, and they see neuroeducation as a young field of study with many possibilities.

From its birth in the decade of the brain (1990), neuroeducation has been understood as an interdisciplinary field that studies developmental learning processes in the human brain. It is one of the last social neurosciences to be born. It has the progressive aim of improving learning-teaching methodologies by applying the results of neuroscientific research.

Neuroscientific research already plays an important role in education. Taking into account the neural bases of human learning, neuroeducation looks not only for theoretical knowledge but also for practical implications, such as new teaching methodologies, and it reviews classical assumptions about learning and studies disorders of learning. Neuroeducation studies offer possibilities such as early detection of special learning needs or even monitoring and comparing different teaching methodologies implemented in school.

Although neuroeducation primarily focuses on disorders of learning, especially in mathematics and language (dyscalculia and dyslexia), can it be extended to other areas? If neuroscience can shed light on the development of ethics in the brain, can such explorations form the basis of a new form of neuroeducation, moral neuroeducation, which studies the learning or development of ethics?

Before introducing a new term (moral neuroeducation), prudence and critical discussion are needed. First, what would the goal of moral neuroeducation be? Should it consider moral disorders in the brain or just immoral behaviours? Second, neuroscientific knowledge is used in neuroeducation to help design practices that allow more efficient teaching to better develop students’ intellectual potentials throughout their training process. Should this be the goal also of moral neuroeducation? Should we strive for greater efficiency in teaching ethics? If so, what is the ethical competence we should try to develop in students?

It seems that we still need a critical and philosophical approach to the promising union of neuroscience and moral education. In my postdoctoral project, Neuroethical Bases for Moral Neuroeducation, I will contribute to developing such an approach.

Daniel Pallarés Domínguez

My postdoctoral research at the Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics (CRB) is linked to a research project funded by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness in Spain. That project is entitled, Moral Neuroeducation for Applied Ethics [FFI2016-76753-C2-2-P], and is led by Domingo García-Marzá.

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Where to publish and not to publish in bioethics – the 2018 list

Stefan Eriksson, Associate Professor of Research Ethics, Uppsala University

Update: The 2019 list is now available!

Allegedly, there are over 12.000 so called predatory journals out there. Instead of supporting readers and science, these journals serve their own economic interests first and at best offer dubious merits for scholars. We believe that scholars working in any academic discipline have a professional interest and a responsibility to keep track of these journals. It is our job to warn the young or inexperienced of journals where a publication or editorship could be detrimental to their career and science is not served. We have seen “predatory” publishing take off in a big way and noticed how colleagues start to turn up in the pages of some of these journals. While many have assumed that this phenomenon mainly is a problem for low status universities, there are strong indications that predatory publishing is a part of a major trend towards the industrialization of misconduct and that it affects many top-flight research institutions (see Priyanka Pulla: “In India, elite institutes in shady journals”, Science 354(6319): 1511-1512). This trend, referred to by some as the dark side of publishing, needs to be reversed.

Gert Helgesson, Professor of Medical Ethics, Karolinska InstitutetThus we published this blog post in 2016. This is our third  annual update (the first version can be found here). At first, we relied heavily on the work of Jeffrey Beall, a librarian at the University of Colorado, who run blacklists of “potential, possible, or probable” predatory publishers and journals. His lists have since been removed although they live on in new form (anonymous) at the Stop predatory journals site (SPJ) and they can also be found archived. The latest effort to create a thorough blacklist comes from Cabells, who distinguish around 70 different unacceptable violations and employs a whole team reviewing journals. These lists are not, however, the final say on the matter, as it is impossible for one person or a limited group to judge reliably actors in every academic discipline. Moreover, since only questionable journals are listed, the good journals must be found elsewhere.

A response of gate keeping needs to be anchored in each discipline and the scholars who make up that discipline. As a suitable response in bioethics, we have chosen to, first, collect a few authoritative lists of recommended bioethics journals that can be consulted by anyone in bioethics to find good journals to publish with. For our first post, we recommended a list of journals ourselves, which brought on some well-deserved questions and criticism about criteria for inclusion. Unfortunately then, our list ultimately drew attention from other parts of the message that we were more concerned to get across. Besides, there are many other parties making such lists. We therefore have dropped this feature. Instead we have enlarged the collection of good journal lists to the service of our readers. They are all of great use when further exploring the reputable journals available:

It is of prime importance to list the journals that are potentially or possibly predatory or of such a low quality that it might be dishonoring to engage with them. We have listed all 50 of them alphabetically (eleven new entries for 2019, two have ceased operation and been removed), and provided both the homepage URL and links to any professional discussion of these journals that we have found (which most often alerted us to their existence in the first place).

Each of these journals asks scholars for manuscripts from, or claims to publish papers in bioethics or related areas (such as practical philosophy). They have been reviewed by the authors of this blog post as well as by a group of reference scholars that we have asked for advice on the list. Those journals listed have unanimously been agreed are journals that – in light of the criticism put forth and the quality we see – we would not deem acceptable for us to publish in. Typical signs as to why a journal could fall in this category, such as extensive spamming, publishing in almost any subject, or fake data being included on the website etc., are listed here:

We have started to more systematically evaluate the journals against the 25 defining characteristics we outlined in the article linked to above (with the help of science and technology PhD students). The results will be added when they exist.

We would love to hear about your views on this blog post, and be especially grateful for pointers to journals engaging in sloppy or bad publishing practices. The list is not meant as a check-list but as a starting point for any bioethics scholar to ponder for him- or herself where to publish.

Also, anyone thinking that a journal in our list should be given due reconsideration might post their reasons for this as a comment to the blog post or send an email to us. Journals might start out with some sloppy practices but shape up over time and we will be happy to hear about it. You can make an appeal against the inclusion of a journal and we will deal with it promptly and publicly.

Please spread the content of this blog as much as you can and check back for updates (we will do a major update annually and continually add any further information found).

WHERE NOT TO PUBLISH IN BIOETHICS – THE 2019 LIST

  • Advance Humanities and Social Sciences (Consortium Publisher)
    Critical remark (2018): Behind this journal you’ll find OMICS, the most-ever discussed publisher of this kind, see http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/predatory-publisher-expanding-empire-in-canada. The only article published in 2016 is very badly edited, all the references are lost in the text and the paper would not pass an exam at our departments.  2017 volume is again only one article. The publisher is listed on SPJ.
  • Advances In Medical Ethics  (Longdom Publishing)
    Critical remark (2019): When asked, one editor attest to the fact that his editorship was forged. Publisher was on Beall’s list.
  • American Open Ethics Journal (Research and Knowledge Publication)
    Critical remark (2019): Listed on Cabells with 7 violations.
  • Annals of Bioethics & Clinical Applications (Medwin Publishers)
    Criticism 1 │ Criticism 2
    Critical remark: Publisher was on Beall’s list and is on many other lists of these journals. They say that they are “accepting all type of original works that is related to the disciplines of the journal” and indeed the flow chart of manuscript handling does not have a reject route. Indexed by alternative indexes.
  • Austin Journal of Genetics and Genomic Research (Austin Publishing Group)
    Criticism 1 │Criticism 2 │Criticism 3
    Critical remark (2017): Spam e-mail about special issue on bioethics; Listed by SPJ; Romanian editorial member is said to be from a university in “Europe”; Another editorial board member is just called “Michael”; APG has been sued by International Association for Dental Research and The American Association of Neurological Surgeons for infringing on their IP rights. Student review concludes the journal is not suitable to publish in.
    Critical remark (2019): Listed by Cabells with 10 violations.
  • British Open Journal of Ethics (British Open Research Publications)
    Critical remark (2019): Listed by Cabells with 6 violations.
  • Creative Education (Scientific Research Publishing – SCIRP)
    Criticism 1 │ Criticism 2
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; They claim misleadingly to be indexed by ISI but this relates to be among cited articles only – they are not indexed. A thorough review May 2017 concludes that it exhibits at least 5 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • East European Scientific Journal (East European Research Alliance)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Criticised by Beall for having a bogus editorial board; Claims to be indexed by ISI but that is not the well-known Institute for Scientific Information (now Thompson Reuters), but rather the so-called International Scientific Indexing. Thorough reviews November 2018 and February 2019  conclude that it exhibits at least 13 or 14 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • Ethics Today Journal (Franklin Publishing)
    Critical remark (2019): Listed by Cabells with 9 violations.
  • European Academic Research (Kogaion Publishing Center, formerly Bridge Center)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Uses impact factor from Universal Impact Factor (now defunct); A thorough review May 2017 concludes that it exhibits at least 15 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • European Scientific Journal (European Scientific Institute)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Use of alternative indexes. A thorough review May 2017 concludes that it exhibits at least 9 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Advances in Social Science and Humanities
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Impact factor given by  Global Impact Factor. A thorough review March 2019 concludes that it exhibits at least 10 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Contemporary Research & Review
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Indexed by Index Copernicus; Despite claims they seem not to be indexed by either Chemical Abstracts or DOAJ. A thorough review June 2017 concludes that it exhibits at least 9 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Current Research
    Criticism
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Uses IF from SJIF and Index Copernicus and more. It wrongly claims to be indexed by Thomson Reuters, ORCID and having a DOI among other things. A thorough review January 2018 concludes that it exhibits at least 12 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Current Research and Academic Review (Excellent Publishers)
    Critical remark (June 2018): Listed by SPJ and Cabells because of misleading claims about credentials, metrics, and too quick review; alternative indexing; publishes in almost any field imaginable; the editor -in-chief is head of the “Excellent Education and Researh Institute” (sic) which does not seem to exist even when spelled right?
  • International Journal of Ethics & Moral Philosophy (Journal Network)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Publisher was criticized by Beall when launching 350 journals at once; After several years not one associate editor has signed up and no article has been published; No editorial or contact details available. A thorough review in May 2019 concludes that it exhibits at least 12 of the 25 criteria for “predatory journals”.
  • International Journal of Ethics in Engineering & Management Education
    Critical remark (2019): Papers from almost any field; Claims to have a 5.4 Impact factor (from IJEEE); Indexed by GJIF etc. A non-existent address in “Varginia”, US (sic!); Open access but asks for the copyright; Claims to be indexed in Scopus can’t be verified. A thorough review February 2018 concludes that it exhibits at least 16 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals. Listed by Cabells with 11 violations found.
  • International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (Centre for Promoting Ideas)
    Criticism 1Criticism 2Criticism 3 │ Criticism 4
    Critical remark (2019): The chief editor listed in April 2014  is a deceased person (2018). A thorough review in April 2019 concludes that it exhibits at least 9 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention
    Criticism 
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ and is on many other lists of blacklisted journals; An IF of 4.5 given by African Quality Centre for Journals; Open access but asks for the copyright; Publishes any subject; Says that the journal is indexed in DOAJ which it does not seem to be. A thorough review February 2018 concludes that it exhibits at least 13 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Research
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Claims an IF of 5.22 (by “Research Journal Impact Factor“); Despite title from India; Alternative indexing; A thorough review February 2018 concludes that it exhibits at least 13 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Has an amazing fast-track review option for $100 that guarantees “the review, editorial decision, author notification and publication” to take place “within 2 weeks”. “Editors” claim that repeated requests to be removed from the list of editors result in nothing. Thorough reviews in  February and June 2018 conclude that it seems to exhibit at least 7 to 10 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Humanities & Social Studies
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; IF from International Impact Factor Services; States that there “is no scope of correction after the paper publication”.
    Critical remark (2018): They write that the “review process will be completed expectedly within 3-4 days”.
  • International Journal of Philosophy (SciencePG)
    Criticism 1 │ Criticism 2
    Critical remark (2017): Listed by SPJ; Alternative indexing and also IF from Universal Impact Factor (now defunct); Promises a two-week peer review. Thorough reviews in April and November 2018 conclude that it seems to exhibit at least 10 or 8 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals and also find obvious examples of pseudo-science among the published articles.
  • International Journal of Philosophy and Theology (American Research Institute for Policy Development)
    Criticism 1 Criticism 2 │ Criticism 3
    Critical remark: A thorough review in June 2018 concludes that “there are grounds to believe that the American Research Institute never intended to create a serious scientific periodical and that, on the contrary, its publications are out-and-out predatory journals.”
  • International Journal of Public Health and Human Rights (Bioinfo Publications)
    Criticism
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ; On many other blacklists and IF from Index Copernicus.
  • International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies (Sryahwa Publications)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ; Open access but asks for the copyright. A thorough review in April 2018 concludes that it seems to exhibit at least 9 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research (Research Publish Journals)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ; On their homepage they state that in order to get a high IF their journals are “indexed in top class organisation around the world” although no major index is used.
  • International Open Journal of Philosophy (Academic and Scientific Publishing)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ and was heavily critized on Beall’s blog; The editorial board consists of one person from Iran; Although boosting 12 issues a year they have published only 1 article in the journal’s first four years; A thorough review March 1 2017 concludes that it exhibits 17 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals and one in March 2019 that it exhibits at least 13 criteria.
  • International Researchers
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ; Indexed by e.g. Index Copernicus; Claims that it is “Monitor by Thomson Reuters” but is not part of the TR journal citation reports; Several pages are not working at time of review; A thorough review April 24 2017 concludes that it exhibits at least 6 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • Internet Journal of Law, Healthcare and Ethics (ISPUB)
    Criticism 1 │ Criticism 2
    Critical remark (2017): Formerly on Beall’s list.
  • Jacobs Journal of Clinical Trials
    Critical remark (2018): Spamming with invitation to special issue on ‘Ethical Issues in Health Care Research’. Have been severely criticized here and also in this scholarly article. Publisher listed on SPJ. A randomly chosen article from issue 1 is markedly flawed in execution.
    Critical remark (2019): Web page is presently down when trying to access.
  • Journal of Academic and Business Ethics (Academic and Business Research Institute)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ as well as several other blacklists; Journal seems uncertain about it’s own name, the header curiously says “Journal of ethical and legal issues”.
  • Journal of Bioethics and Applications (Sci Forschen)
    Critical remark (2018): Brand new journal with no articles yet. Publisher has been criticized for spamming more than once, have a bad record at Scam Analyze, and is listed on SPJ.
  • Journal of Clinical Research & Bioethics (OMICS)
    Criticism 1Criticism 2 │ Criticism 3 │ Criticism 4 │ Criticism 5 │ Criticism 6
    Critical remark (2017): This publisher is listed on SPJ and was taken to court for possible fraud by the Federal Trade Commission in the US (and lost). They are listed by Cabells for 8 violations.
  • Journal of International Ethical Theory and Practice (MedCrave)
    Criticism 1 │ Criticism 2 │ Criticism 3 │ Criticism 4 │ Criticism 5 │ Criticism 6 │ Criticism 7
    Critical remark (May 2018): New journal with no articles or issues yet – but still is in need of so many editors that spam emails are sent. They kindly allow for scientific articles: “The research articles can include the findings and the methodology you used.” MedCrave uses many alternative indexing services. They are listed by SPJ. They also spam the Internet with claims for all criticism to be a hoax or fake news.
    Update 2019: Have ceased operations, apparently.
  • Journal of Law and Ethics
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ; Claims to be on Ulrichs but is not; Claims to be in the Norwegian list and can actually be found there but under its former name (4 years earlier) and with 0 points.
    Update 2019: Seems to have moved to here. Security warnings and denied access makes it impossible to check whether it is the same journal or another one.
  • Journal of Philosophy and Ethics (Sryahwa Publications)
    Critical remark (2019): listed by Cabells for 7 violations.
  • Journal of Research in Philosophy and History (Scholink)
    Criticism 1 │
    Critical remark (June 2018): Listed on several lists of predatory publishers. They only do “peer review” through their own editorial board, a flowchart states. They claim to check for plagiarism but the first 2018 article abstract run by us through a checker turned out to be self-plagiarized from a book and it looks to have been published many times over. Unfortunately, the next paper checked in the same issue was also published the previous year by another journal listed here…
  • Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (AASCIT)
    Criticism 1Criticism 2Criticism 3
    Critical remark (2019): From law to religion, this journal publishes it all. Though publisher claims to be “American”, it has only two editors, both from India. The list from Cabells includes 13 journals from this publisher. The AASCIT Code of Ethics apparently plagiarizes the INCOSE Code of Ethics.
  • Journal of Studies in Social Sciences and Humanities
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ; Alternative indexing; Uses several alternative IF providers. A thorough review October 2017 concludes that it exhibits at least 9 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • JSM Health Education and Primary Health Care
    Spamming with invitation to special issue on ‘Bioethics’. The publisher is listed on SPJ,  and criticized and exposed here. It is indexed by spoof indexer Directory of Research Journals Indexing among others (whose website is now gone, BTW).
    Update 2019: Access denied because of non-secure connection.
  • Medical Ethics and Communication (Avid Science)
    Criticism
    Critical remarks (2017): Listed on SPJ; Spamming researchers with offer of eBook publication for $350.
  • Nova Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences
    Criticism
    Critical remark (2018): This publisher was on Beall’s list; Uses alternative impact factors and indexing; Publishes in less than 30 days; Curiously, it says no fee is charged for publication.
    Update 2019: Web pass alert on entering the site.
  • Open Journal of Philosophy (Scientific Research Publishing – SCIRP)
    Criticism 1 │ Criticism 2 │ Criticism 3 │
  • Philosophical Papers and Review (Academic Journals)
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ and blacklisted by the Ministry of Higher Education of Malaysia; Although it claims to be a peer-review journal, it states that manuscripts “are reviewed by editorial board members or other qualified persons”.
  • Philosophy Study  (David Publishing Company)
    Criticism 1Criticism 2
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ.
  • The Recent Advances in Academic Science Journal (Swedish Scientific Publications)
    Critical remark (2018): Despite the publisher’s name it seems based in India. The only Swedish editor’s existence cannot be verified. Website quality is lacking. Listed on SPJ. A thorough review October 2017 concludes that it exhibits at least 15 of the 25 criteria for “predatory” journals.
  • Universal Open Ethics Journal (Adyan Academic Press)
    Critical remark (2019): listed by Cabells for 7 violations.
  • World Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (Science and Education Publishing, SciEP)
    Criticism 1 │Criticism 2
    Critical remark (2017): Listed on SPJ as well as many other blacklists.

End remark:

In light of recent legal action taken against people trying to warn others about dubious publishers and journals – see here and here, for example – we want to stress that this blog post is about where we would like our articles to show up, it is about quality, and as such it is an expression of a professional judgement intended to help authors find good journals with which to publish. Indirectly, this may also help readers to be more discerning about the articles they read. As such it is no different from other rankings that can be found for various products and services everywhere. Our list of where not to publish implies no accusation of deception or fraud but claims to identify journals that experienced bioethicists would usually not find to be of high quality. Those criticisms linked to might be more upfront or confrontational; us linking to them does not imply an endorsement of any objectionable statement made therein. We would also like to point out that individual papers published in these journals might of course nevertheless be perfectly acceptable contributions to the scholarly literature of bioethics.

Stefan Eriksson & Gert Helgesson

Read more about Stefan’s work at CRB here

Essential resources on so-called predatory publishing and open access:

We like ethics : www.ethicsblog.crb.uu.se

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