A research blog from the Centre for Resarch Ethics & Bioethics (CRB)

Month: September 2025

Interprofessional collaboration in hospital care of patients who self-harm

Patients who are treated in hospital for self-harm can sometimes arouse strong emotions in the staff. At the same time, the patients may be dissatisfied with their care, which sometimes involves restrictions and safety measures to prevent self-harm. In addition to such tensions between patients and staff, the healthcare staff is divided into different professions with their own roles and responsibilities. These professional groups may have different perspectives and thus conflicting opinions about what care individual patients should receive. In order for patients to receive good and cohesive care, good interprofessional collaboration is therefore required between, for example, nurses and psychiatrists.

A Swedish interview study examined how nurses and psychiatrists think about their responsibility and autonomy in relation to each other in different situations on the ward. In general, they considered themselves autonomous, they could take their professional responsibility without being influenced by other colleagues. Both groups agreed that psychiatrists had the ultimate responsibility for the patients’ care, and it emerged that the nurses saw themselves as the patients’ advocates. If decisions made by the psychiatrist went against the patient’s wishes, they saw it as their task to explain the patient’s views, even if they did not agree with them.

However, sometimes the scope for action could be affected by decisions made by colleagues. For example, one could experience that the scope for taking responsibility for a patient was reduced if colleagues had already isolated the patient. In other cases, one could experience that colleagues’ decisions increased one’s responsibility, for example if decisions based on ignorance about a patient risked leading to new self-harm that the nurses had to deal with.

An important theme in the interviews was how one could sometimes renunciate some of one’s professional autonomy in order to achieve interprofessional collaboration. The interviewees agreed that one ultimately had to stand united behind decisions and set aside one’s own agendas and opinions. Consensus was considered essential and was sought even if it meant reducing one’s own autonomy and power. Consensus was achieved through discussions in the team where participants humbly respected each other’s professional roles, knowledge and experiences.

In their conclusion, the authors emphasize that the study shows how nurses and psychiatrists are prepared to set aside hierarchies and their own autonomy in order to achieve collaboration and shared responsibility in the care of patients with self-harm. Since this has not been visible in previous studies, they suggest that attitudes and skills towards interprofessional collaboration may have improved. As this is essential for good cohesive care of patients, it is important to continue to support such attitudes and skills.

If you want to see all the results from the interview study and read the authors’ discussion about responsibility and autonomy in interprofessional collaboration, you can find the article here: Navigating consensus, interprofessional collaboration between nurses and psychiatrists in hospital care for patients with deliberate self-harm.

Pär Segerdahl

Written by…

Pär Segerdahl, Associate Professor at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics and editor of the Ethics Blog.

Löfström, E. et al. (2025) ‘Navigating consensus, interprofessional collaboration between nurses and psychiatrists in hospital care for patients with deliberate self-harm’, Journal of Interprofessional Care, 39(3), pp. 479–486. doi: 10.1080/13561820.2025.2482691

This post in Swedish

We recommend readings

What is philosophical health and can it be mapped?

Philosophers such as Socrates and philosophical schools such as Stoicism have had a certain influence on psychology and psychotherapy, and thus also on human health. But if philosophy can support human health via psychology, can it not support health more directly, on its own? A growing trend today is to offer philosophical conversations as a form of philosophical practice that can support human health in existential dimensions. The trend to offer philosophical conversations is linked to a concept of health that is not only about physical and mental health, and which does not understand health as merely the absence of disease: philosophical health.

What does it mean to talk about philosophical health? Given all the health ideals that already affect self-esteem, should we now also be influenced by philosophical health ideals that make our lives feel hopelessly ill-conceived and pointless? No, on the contrary, the stress that human ideals and norms create can be an important topic to philosophize about, in peace and quiet. Instead of being burdened by more ideas about how we should live, instead of giving the appearance of fulfilling the ideals, we can freely examine this underlying stress: the daily feeling of being compelled to live the way we imagine we should. No wonder philosophical practice is a growing trend. Finally, we get time to think openly about what other trends usually make us hide: ourselves, when we do not identify with the trends, the norms and the ideals.

Philosophizing sounds heavy and demanding but can actually be the exact opposite. I have written an essay about how philosophical self-examination, in its best moments, can lighten the mind by unexpectedly illuminating our many tacit demands and expectations. Unfortunately, the essay is not published with open access, but here is the link: The Wisdom of Intellectual Asceticism.

A colleague at CRB, Luis de Miranda, has long worked with philosophical health both as a practitioner and researcher. He emphasizes that human health also includes existential dimensions such as harmony, meaning and purpose in life, and that in order to support wellbeing in these intimately universal dimensions, people also need opportunities to reflect on life. In a new article (written with six co-authors), he develops the concept in the form of a research tool that could map philosophical health: a philosophical health compass. The idea is that the compass will make it possible to study philosophical health in more quantitative ways, for example making comparisons between populations and assessing the effects of different forms of philosophical practice.

The compass consists of a questionnaire. Respondents are asked to consider statements about 6 existential dimensions of life, revolving around the body, the self, belonging, possibilities in life, purpose, and finally, their own philosophical reflection. Each dimension is explored through 8 statements. Respondents indicate on a 5-point scale how well the total of 48 statements apply to them.

I cannot judge how well the 48 statements are chosen, or how easy it is for people to take a position on them, but the statements are more concrete than you might think and it will be exciting to see what happens when the compass is put to the test. Will it be able to measure the wisdom of the crowd, can philosophically relevant differences and changes be mapped? If you want to take a closer look at the philosophical health compass, you can find the article here: The philosophical health compass: A new and comprehensive assessment tool for researching existential dimensions of wellbeing.

Luis de Miranda warns that the compass may risk not only supporting philosophical health, but also undermining it if the compass is interpreted as an ideal that determines the qualities that distinguish good philosophical health. Using the compass wisely requires great openness and sensitivity, he emphasizes. Yes, hopefully the compass will raise many philosophical questions about what philosophical health is, and how it can be studied. For what is the great openness and responsiveness that Luis de Miranda emphasizes, if not philosophical inquisitiveness itself?

Pär Segerdahl

Written by…

Pär Segerdahl, Associate Professor at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics and editor of the Ethics Blog.

Pär Segerdahl; The Wisdom of Intellectual Asceticism. Common Knowledge 1 January 2025; 31 (1): 74–88. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/0961754X-11580693

de Miranda, L., Ingvolstad Malmgren, C., Carroll, J. E., Gould, C. S., King, R., Funke, C., & Arslan, S. (2025). The philosophical health compass: A new and comprehensive assessment tool for researching existential dimensions of wellbeing. Methodological Innovations, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/20597991251352420

This post in Swedish

Thinking about thinking

What does precision medicine and AI mean for the relationship between doctor and patient?

In a sense, all care strives to be tailored to the individual patient. But the technical possibilities to obtain large amounts of biological data from individuals have increased so significantly that today one is talking about a paradigm shift and a new way of working with disease: precision medicine. Instead of giving all patients with a certain type of cancer the same standard treatment, for example, it is possible to map unique genetic changes in individual patients and determine which of several alternative treatments is likely to work best on the individual patient’s tumor. Other types of individual biological data can also be produced to identify the right treatment for the patient and avoid unnecessary side effects.

Of course, AI will play an increasingly important role in precision medicine. It can help identify relevant patterns in the large amount of biological data and provide support for precision medicine decisions about the treatment of individual patients. But what can all this mean for the relationship between doctor and patient?

The question is examined in a research article in BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making, with Mirko Ancillotti as main author. The researchers interviewed ten physicians from six European countries. All physicians worked with patients with colorectal cancer. In the interviews, the physicians highlighted, among other things, that although it is possible to compile large amounts of individual biological data, it is still difficult to tailor treatments for colorectal cancer because there are only a few therapies available. The physicians also discussed the difficulties of distinguishing between experimental and conventional treatments when testing new ways to treat colorectal cancer in precision medicine.

Furthermore, the physicians generally viewed AI as a valuable future partner in the care of patients with colorectal cancer. AI can compile large amounts of data from different sources and provide new insights, make actionable recommendations and support less experienced physicians, they said in the interviews. At the same time, issues of trust were evident in the interviews. For example, the physicians wondered how they can best rely on AI results when they do not know how the AI ​​system arrived at them. They also discussed responsibility. Most said that even when AI is used, the physicians and the team are responsible for the care decisions. However, they said that sometimes responsibility can be shared with AI developers and with those who decide on the use of AI in healthcare.

Finally, the physicians described challenges in communicating with patients. How do you explain the difference between experimental and conventional treatment in precision medicine? How do you explain how AI works and how it helps to tailor the patient’s treatment? How do you avoid hype and overconfidence in “new” treatments and how do you explain that precision medicine can also mean that that a patient is not offered a certain treatment?

If you would like to see more results and the authors’ discussion, you can find the article here: Exploring doctors’ perspectives on precision medicine and AI in colorectal cancer: opportunities and challenges for the doctor-patient relationship.

Some of the study’s conclusions are that good integration of AI and precision medicine requires clearer regulation and ethical guidelines, and that physicians need support to meet the challenge of explaining how AI is used to tailor patient treatment. It is also important that AI remains an auxiliary tool and not an independent decision-maker. Otherwise, patients’ trust can be eroded, as can physicians’ autonomy, the authors argue.

Pär Segerdahl

Written by…

Pär Segerdahl, Associate Professor at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics and editor of the Ethics Blog.

Ancillotti, M., Grauman, Å., Veldwijk, J. et al. Exploring doctors’ perspectives on precision medicine and AI in colorectal cancer: opportunities and challenges for the doctor-patient relationship. BMC Med Inform Decis Mak 25, 283 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12911-025-03134-0

This post in Swedish

We have a clinical perspective

Mind the gap between ethics in principle and ethics in practice

When ethical dilemmas are discussed using case descriptions or vignettes, we tend to imagine the cases as taken from reality. Of course, the vignettes are usually invented and the descriptions adapted to illustrate ethical principles, but when we discuss the cases, we tend to have the attitude that they are real. Or at least real possibilities: “What should we do if we encounter a case like this?”

Discussing ethical cases is an extremely good exercise in ethical reasoning and an important part of the education and training of healthcare professionals. But sometimes we may also need to keep in mind that these discussions are adapted exercises in the ethics gym, so to speak. Reality rarely delivers separate dilemmas that can be handled one by one. Often, life is rather a continuous flow of more or less clearly experienced challenges that change faster than we can describe them. We cannot always say what the problem situation actually looks like. Therefore, it may sometimes be wise not to decide or act immediately, but to wait for the situation to take a different and perhaps clearer form. And then the ethical problem may in practice have been partially resolved, or become more manageable, or become obsolete.

Does that sound irresponsible? Judging by two texts that I want to recommend today, responsible healthcare professionals may, on the contrary, experience a friction between ethics in principle and ethics in practice, and that it would be unethical not to take this seriously. The first text is an essay by Joar Björk (who is both an ethicist and a palliative care physician). In the journal Palliative Care and Social Practice, he discusses a fictional patient case. A man with disseminated prostate cancer is cared for by a palliative care team. In the vignette, the man has previously expressed that he wants complete knowledge of his situation and what his death might look like. But when the team has time to talk to him, he suddenly changes his mind and says that he does not want to know anything, and that the issue should not be raised again. How to act now?

According to Joar Björk, the principle-based ethical standard recommendation here would probably be the following. Respect for the patient’s autonomy requires that the team not try to carry out the conversation. Only if there is good reason to believe that a conversation can have great medical benefit can one consider trying to inform the patient in some way.

Note that the principle-based recommendation treats the situation that has arisen as a separate case: as a ready-made vignette that cannot be changed. But in practice, palliative teams care for their patients continuously for a long time: so much is constantly changing. Of course, they are aware that they cannot impose information on patients who state that they do not want it, as it violates the principle of autonomy. But in practice, the unexpected situation is an unclear ethical challenge for the care team. What really happened, why did he change his mind? Does the man suddenly refuse to accept his situation and the proximity of death? Maybe the team should cautiously try to talk more to him rather than less? How can the team plan the man’s care – maybe soon a hospital bed will be needed in his home – if they are not allowed to talk to him about his situation? As palliative care teams develop good listening and communication skills, the situation may very well soon look different. Everything changes!

Joar Björk’s reflections give the reader an idea of ​​how ethical challenges in practice take on different forms than in the vignettes that are so important in ethics teaching and training. How does he deal with the gap between ethics in principle and ethics in practice? As I understand him, Joar Björk does not advocate any definite view on how to proceed. But he is trying to formulate what he calls a palliative care ethos, which could provide better ethical guidance in cases such as the one just described. Several authors working in palliative care have attempted to formulate aspects of such a care ethos. In his essay, Joar Björk summarizes their efforts in 11 points. What previously sounded passive and irresponsible – to wait and see – appears in Joar Björk’s list in the form of words of wisdom such as “Everything changes” and “Adaptation and improvisation.”

Can healthcare professionals then find better ethical guidance in such practical attitudes than in well-established bioethical principles? Joar Björk tentatively discusses how the 11 points taken together could provide guidance that is more sensitive to the practical contexts of palliative care. I myself wonder, however – but I do not know – whether it would not be wise to allow the gap between ethics in principle and ethics in practice to be as wide as it is. The 11 points probably have their origin in an ethical care practice that already functions as the points describe it. The practice works that way without healthcare professionals using the points as some kind of soft guidance. Joar Björk thus describes a palliative care ethics in practice; a description that can help us think more clearly about the differences between the two forms of ethics. Reflecting on the 11 points can, for example, make healthcare professionals more aware of the specifics of their practice, so that they do not wrongly blame themselves if they do not always relate to situations that arise as if they were separate cases that illustrate ethical principles.

Perhaps it is impudent of me to suggest this possibility in a blog post that recommends reading, but Joar Björk’s reflections are so thought-provoking that I cannot help it. Read his essay here: Ethical reflection: The palliative care ethos and patients who refuse information.

You will certainly find Joar Björk’s reflections interesting. Therefore, I would like to mention a new book that also reflects on the gap between ethics in principle and ethics in practice. The book is written by Stephen Scher and Kaisa Kozlowska and is published with open access. You can find it here: Revitalizing Health Care Ethics. The Clinician’s Voice.

So, I think it is difficult to see clearly the difference between ethics in principle and ethics in practice. We tend to transfer characteristics from one to the other, and become dissatisfied when it does not work. The book by Scher and Kozlowska therefore uses the warning “Mind the gap” to draw attention to the difference. If we mind the gap between the platform and the train – if we do not imagine the train as an overly mobile platform, and the platform as an overly stationary train – then perhaps the two forms of ethics can accept and find better support in each other. More often than we think, we are dissatisfied for the simple reason that we fail to keep different things apart.

Pär Segerdahl

Written by…

Pär Segerdahl, Associate Professor at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics and editor of the Ethics Blog.

Björk J. Ethical reflection: The palliative care ethos and patients who refuse information. Palliative Care and Social Practice. 2025;19. doi:10.1177/26323524251355287

Stephen Scher, Kasia Kozlowska. 2025. Revitalizing Health Care Ethics. The Clinician’s Voice. Palgrave Macmillan Cham.

This post in Swedish

We recommend readings