A blog from the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics (CRB)

Month: April 2018

Read this interview with Kathinka Evers!

Through philosophical analysis and development of concepts, Uppsala University contributes significantly to the European Flagship, the Human Brain Project. New ways of thinking about the brain and about consciousness are suggested, which take us beyond oppositions between consciousness and unconsciousness, and between consciousness and matter.

Do you want to know more? Read the fascinating interview with Kathinka Evers: A continuum of consciousness: The Intrinsic Consciousness Theory

Kathinka Evers at CRB in Uppsala leads the work on neuroethics and neurophilosophy in the Human Brain Project.

Pär Segerdahl

We recommend readings - the Ethics Blog

When fear of obscurity produces obscurity

Pär SegerdahlObscurely written texts make us angry. First, we get annoyed because we do not understand. Then comes the fear, the fear of being duped by a cheat. Our fear is so strong that we do not dare to acknowledge it. Instead, we seriously suspect that there are madcaps who for some inscrutable reason write tons of nonsense. We had better take shelter in the house of reason!

Certainly, there are chatterboxes who talk nonsense. My own fear in this post is that fear of the obscure will make us shallow. Insightfulness easy appears as obscurity. It takes time to understand insightful texts. We often reread them; we age with them. If we do not give us that time, but demand immediate gratification, we might reject insightful texts as obscure and perhaps even dangerous.

There is an ideal of eradicating all obscurity: Write verbally explicitly, without any holes in the chain of reasons! The works of great thinkers are often scrutinized according to this ideal: Are there overlooked holes in their arguments through which truth might slip out? Can the holes be repaired, or will the ship sink with its cargo of truth claims?

A problem with this ideal of reason is that it can undermine our own literacy. The ideal can make even plain texts seem obscure, which reinforces the fear of being duped by cheats; hordes of them. Suddenly, one wants to correct all humanity, who apparently has not yet learned to be reasonable.

The ideal of reason becomes a demand for a small circle of intellectual ascetics who write intricately argued texts to each other: texts that, however, become incomprehensible to the rest of humanity. Like impregnable walls, protecting the house of reason.

Fear of obscurity risks making us both shallow and obscure. Therefore, take care of your fear! That is also a way of being reasonable. Perhaps a more insightful way.

Pär Segerdahl

This post in Swedish

Minding our language - the Ethics Blog

Rules for authorship must be clarified

Pär SegerdahlRecently, I wrote a post on honorary authorships in the academia. When I in that post tried to render the ICMJE criteria for academic authorship, I felt dull since I could not figure out how to express in my own words the fourth criterion:

”Agreement to be accountable for all aspects of the work in ensuring that questions related to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the work are appropriately investigated and resolved.”

To count as an author of an academic publication, it is not sufficient to contribute to the research, to drafting or revising the intellectual content of the text, and to approve the final version. You must also satisfy this fourth criterion, which has to do with responsibility for research misconduct.

What does the criterion actually say? After reading an opinion piece by Gert Helgesson and Stefan Eriksson in Learned Publishing, I realize that it was not just my stupidity that caused my difficulties to summarize the fourth criterion. The formulation is ambiguous, which may be due to disagreement among the authors of the authorship criteria!

Helgesson and Eriksson find three possible interpretations of the fourth criterion:

  1. Emphasizing the initial ten words (until the first instance of “work”), the criterion seems to say that all authors are responsible, or should be held responsible, for all parts of the article. If the work was fraudulent in some way, all authors should be held responsible, even if they were unaware of what was going on.
  2. Continuing to read the whole criterion, its meaning changes. The criterion then seems to say that if fraudulence is suspected, then all authors have the responsibility to facilitate the investigation of the suspicions (regardless of what part of the work the suspicions concern).
  3. A third interpretation goes further than the second interpretation. It says that an author should support investigations of fraudulence not only after the article was sent to a journal. An author should initiate such investigations him- or herself already during the research and drafting phase, if he or she suspects fraudulence.

It is impossible to determine which interpretation holds. Helgesson and Eriksson consider the third interpretation most reasonable from a research ethical point of view. If this is the intended interpretation, it should be made linguistically unmistakable in the next revision of the authorship criteria, the opinion piece concludes.

Pär Segerdahl

Helgesson, G. and Eriksson, S. Revise the ICMJE Recommendations regarding authorship responsibility! Learned Publishing 2018. doi: 10.1002/leap.1161

This post in Swedish

We participate in debates - the Ethics Blog

Risks of discrimination in population-based biobanks

Pär SegerdahlEven good intentions can cause harm. Considerately treating certain groups as “vulnerable,” such as pregnant women and children, can cause discrimination against them. If we protect them from participation in clinical research, we know less about how they respond to medical treatments. They are therefore exposed to greater risks when they are patients in need of medical treatment. Thanks for your concern.

Deborah Mascalzoni points out possible discrimination patterns in population-based biobank research. She particularly highlights people with psychiatric conditions, who often are excluded from such studies. However, she also mentions children, who rarely are included in population-based biobanks, as well as people with early forms of dementia or addiction problems.

Mascalzoni thus asks how representative population-based biobanks really are. This is important, as results from such research are increasingly used in the planning of care. We need to see these potential discrimination patterns more clearly, so that people suffering from psychiatric conditions, for example, have similar opportunities to benefit from research as others.

However, the patterns are caused not only by how we think of certain groups as “vulnerable.” Even practical difficulties, to which you may not give much thought, can cause discrimination. It is ethically and legally cumbersome to recruit children as research participants. People suffering from depression may have suicidal thoughts, which requires special efforts. People with early symptoms of dementia may have difficulty understanding complex information, which complicates the process of informed consent.

Some groups are in practice more difficult to recruit to population-based biobanks. Not only our consideration of certain groups as “vulnerable,” then, but also practical obstacles to which we do not pay attention, may cause biased research results, which may lead to poorer care for certain groups. There is therefore reason to ask about representativeness.

Pär Segerdahl

Mascalzoni, D. 2017. Reverse discrimination for psychiatric genetic studies in population-based biobanks. European Neuropsychopharmacology 27: 475-476

This post in Swedish

We want to be just - the Ethics Blog