A blog from the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics (CRB)

Tag: applied ethics

The need for self-critical expertise in public policy making

Academics are often recruited as experts in committees tasked with developing guidelines for public services, such as healthcare. It is of course important that policy documents for public services are based on knowledge and understanding of the problems. At the same time, the role of an expert is far from self-evident, because the problems that need to be addressed are not purely academic and cannot be defined in the same way that researchers define their research questions. A competent academic who accepts the assignment as an expert therefore has reason to feel both confident and uncertain. It would be unfortunate otherwise. This also affects the expectations of those around them, not least the authority that commissions the experts to develop the guidelines. The expert should be given the opportunity to point out any ambiguities in the committee’s assignment and also to be uncertain about his or her role as an expert. Again, it would be unfortunate otherwise. But if the expert role is contradictory, if it contains both certainty and uncertainty, both knowledge and self-criticism, how are we to understand it?

A realistic starting point for discussing this question is an article in Politics & Policy, written by Erica Falkenström and Rebecca Selberg. They conducted an empirical case study of ethical problems related to the development of Swedish guidelines for intensive care during the COVID-19 pandemic: “National principles for prioritization in intensive care under extraordinary circumstances.” The expert group consisted of 11 men, all physicians or philosophers. The lack of diversity is obviously problematic. The professional group that most directly comes into contact with the organizational challenges in healthcare, nurses, mostly women, was not represented in the expert group. Nor did the expert group include any social scientists, who could have contributed knowledge about structural problems in Swedish healthcare even before the pandemic broke out, such as problems related to the fact that elderly care in Sweden is administered separately by the municipalities. Patients in municipal nursing homes were among the most severely affected groups during the pandemic. They were presented in the policy document as a frail group that should preferably be kept away from hospitals (where the most advanced medical care is provided), and instead be cared for on site in the nursing homes. A problematic aspect of this was that the group of elderly patients in municipal care did not have access to competent medical assessment of their individual ability to cope with intensive care, which could possibly be seen as discriminatory. This reduction in the number of patients requiring intensive care may in turn have given the regional authorities responsible for intensive care reason to claim that they had sufficient resources. Moreover, if one of the purposes of the guidelines was to reduce stress among healthcare staff, one might wonder what impact the guidelines had on the stress level of municipal employees in nursing homes.

The authors identify ethical issues concerning three aspects of the work to develop the national guidelines: regarding the starting points, regarding the content of the document, and regarding the implementation of the guidelines. They also discuss an alternative political-philosophical way of approaching the role of being an expert, which could counteract the problems described in the case study. This alternative philosophical approach, “engaged political philosophy,” is contrasted with a more conventional philosophical expert role, which according to the alternative view overemphasizes the role of philosophy. Among other things, by letting philosophical theory define the problem without paying sufficient attention to the context. Instead, more open questions should be asked. Why did the problem become a public issue right now? What are the positions and what drives people apart? By starting from such open-ended questions about the context, the politically engaged philosopher can identify values ​​at stake, the facts of the current situation and its historical background, and possible contemporary alternatives. As well as including several different forms of relevant expertise. A broader understanding of the circumstances that created the problem can also help authorities and experts to understand when it would be better not to propose a new policy, the authors point out.

I personally think that the risk of experts overemphasizing the importance of their own forms of knowledge is possibly widespread and not unique to philosophy. An alternative approach to the role of being an expert probably requires openness to its basic contradiction: the expert both knows and does not know. No academic discipline can make exclusive claim to such self-critical awareness, although self-examination can be described as philosophical in a broad sense that takes us beyond academic boundaries.

I recommend the article in Politics & Policy as a fruitful case study for further research and reflection on challenges in the role of being an expert: Ethical Problems and the Role of Expertise in Health Policy: A Case Study of Public Policy Making in Sweden During COVID-19.

Pär Segerdahl

Written by…

Pär Segerdahl, Associate Professor at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics and editor of the Ethics Blog.

Falkenström, E. and Selberg, R. (2025), Ethical Problems and the Role of Expertise in Health Policy: A Case Study of Public Policy Making in Sweden During COVID-19. Politics & Policy, 53: e12646. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12646

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Neuroethics: don’t let the name fool you

Names easily give the impression that the named is something separate and autonomous: something to which you can attach a label. If you want to launch something and get attention – “here is something completely new to reckon with” – it is therefore a good idea to immediately create a new name that spreads the image of something very special.

Despite this, names usually lag behind what they designate. The named has already taken shape, without anyone noticing it as anything special. In the freedom from a distinctive designation, roots have had time to spread and branches to stretch far. Since everything that is given freedom to grow is not separate and autonomous, but rooted, interwoven and in exchange with its surroundings, humans eventually notice it as something interesting and therefore give it a special name. New names can thus give a misleading image of the named as newer and more separate and autonomous than it actually is. When the name arrives, almost everything is already prepared in the surroundings.

In an open peer commentary in the journal AJOB Neuroscience, Kathinka Evers, Manuel Guerrero and Michele Farisco develop a similar line of reasoning about neuroethics. They comment on an article published in the same issue that presents neuroethics as a new field only 15 years old. The authors of the article are concerned by the still unfinished and isolated nature of the field and therefore launch a vision of a “translational neuroethics,” which should resemble that tree that has had time to grow together with its surroundings. In the vision, the new version of neuroethics is thus described as integrated, inclusive and impactful.

In their commentary, Kathinka Evers and co-authors emphasize that it is only the label “neuroethics” that has existed for 15 years. The kind of questions that neuroethics works with were already dealt with in the 20th century in applied ethics and bioethics, and some of the conceptual problems have been discussed in philosophy since antiquity. Furthermore, ethics committees have dealt with neuroethical issues long before the label existed. Viewed in this way, neuroethics is not a new and separate field, but rather a long-integrated and cooperating sub-discipline to neuroscience, philosophy and bioethics – depending on which surroundings we choose to emphasize.

Secondly, the commentators point out, the three characteristics of a “translational neuroethics” – integration, inclusiveness and impact – are a prerequisite for something to be considered a scientific field. An isolated field that does not include knowledge and perspectives from surrounding sciences and areas of interest, and that lacks practical impact, is hardly what we see today as a research field. The three characteristics are therefore not entirely successful as a vision of a future development of neuroethics. If the field is to deserve its name at all, the characteristics must already permeate neuroethics. Do they do that?

Yes, say the commentators if I understand them correctly. But in order to see this we must not be deceived by the distinctive designation, which gives the image of something new, separate and autonomous. We must see that work on neuroethical issues has been going on for a long time in several different philosophical and scientific contexts. Already when the field got its distinctive name, it was integrated, inclusive and impactful, not least within the academically established discipline of bioethics. Some problematic tendencies toward isolation have indeed existed, but they were related to the distinctive label, as it was sometimes used by isolated groups to present their activities as something new and special to be reckoned with.

The open commentary is summarized by the remark that we should avoid the temptation to see neuroethics as a completely new, autonomous and separate discipline: the temptation that the name contributes to. Such an image makes us myopic, the commentators write, which paradoxically can make it more difficult to support the three objectives of the vision. It is both truer and more fruitful to consider neuroethics and bioethics as distinct but not separate fields. If this is true, we do not need to launch an even newer version of neuroethics under an even newer label.

Read the open commentary here: Neuroethics & bioethics: distinct but not separate. If you want to read the article that is commented on, you will find the reference at the bottom of this post.

Pär Segerdahl

Written by…

Pär Segerdahl, Associate Professor at the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics and editor of the Ethics Blog.

K. Evers, M. Guerrero & M. Farisco (2023) Neuroethics & Bioethics: Distinct but Not Separate, AJOB Neuroscience, 14:4, 414-416, DOI: 10.1080/21507740.2023.2257162

Anna Wexler & Laura Specker Sullivan (2023) Translational Neuroethics: A Vision for a More Integrated, Inclusive, and Impactful Field, AJOB Neuroscience, 14:4, 388-399, DOI: 10.1080/21507740.2021.2001078

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